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I. INTRODUcnON

The survival of individual wild animals, as well as species of
wildlife, is dependent upon habitat, which provides wildlife with
food, shelter, protection (from human and animal predators), breeding sites, and sites for rearing and nesting their young. In order for a
particular area or ecosystem to provide a suitable habitat for a
particular species of wildlife, the area may have to contain certain
types of geological features (e.g., caves, mountains, etc.), particular
types of waterbodies, particular types of trees or plants, or other species of wildlife. 1 The destruction or alteration of wildlife habitat may
deprive members of that wildlife species of food, shelter, protection,
reproduction sites, or nesting sites, and cause the death of individual
wild animals and, eventually, the extinction of an entire species of
wildlife. 2 Habitat modification of a wildlife species may result in the
eventual extinction of the species when members of the species are
unable to adapt to changes in their habitat because they have
"become intimately tied" to the conditions of their existing habitat
"through evolution."3
Representative Sullivan, the floor manager of the House version
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,4 stated during a legislative
process that:
For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from the
destruction of their habitat. The destruction may be intentional, as
would be the case in clearing of fields and forests for development
or resource extraction, or it may be unintentional, as in the case of
the spread of pesticides beyond their target area. Whether it is intentional or not, however, the result is unfortunate for the species of
animals that depend on that habitat, most of whom are already living on the edge of survivaLs

1. For example, some types of bird species may forage on insects, fruits, and seeds found
only in particular types of trees in particular locations, see Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &:
Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 998-90 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981);
Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub.
nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), and also may be dependent upon the
same types of trees for shelter, "reproduction requirements," and nesting sites. See Sierra Club
v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1265; Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp.
at 989.
'"
2. See PaUla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.
Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9thCir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1271-72.
3. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.7. See Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1269 ("[T)he
actions of man have taken an increasing toll on the survivability of various species, particularly those which. due to their particular habits and lifestyles, are unable to adapt to a changing
environment. A).
4. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
5. 119 CONGo REC. H3Q,162 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973).
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The United States Supreme Court has noted that lIin shaping the
[Endangered Species] Act, Congress started from the finding that
'[t]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of
natural habitat.' ... Of these twin threats, Congress was informed
that the greatest was destruction of natural habitat. 1I6 The drafters of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973:
realized that the degradation of habitats posed one of the gravest
threats to the continued existence of endangered and threatened
species.... Indeed, the first stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and
threatened species depend may be conserved .... "7

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 contains several provisions
that seek to protect and preserve the habitat of endangered species8
and threatened species.9 Section 510 of the Endangered Species Act
grants the Secretaries of the Interior, Commerce and Agriculture
authority to acquire land to preserve the habitat of protected species
as part of conservation programs for endangered and threatened

6. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (citation omitted).
7. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,8 (D.C Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C J., concurring)
(quoting 16 U.S.C § 1531(b) (1988», modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994),
reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
8. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 defines "endangered species" to mean "any species
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a
species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection
under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to
man" 16 U.S.C § 1532(6) (1988). The term "species" is defined by the Act to include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of
vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 16 U.S.C § 1532(16) (1988). Particular species of wildlife are designated as an endangered species pursuant to the procedures
of section 4 of the Act. 16 U.S.C § 1533 (1988). Species of wildlife that have been listed as endangered are set forth at 50 CF.R. § 17.11 (1993).
9. "Threatened species" is defined by the Endangered Species Act to mean "any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all
or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C § 1532(20) (1988). Particular species of wildlife
are designated as threatened species pursuant to the procedures of section 4 of the Act. 16
U.S.C § 1533 (1988). Species of wildlife that have been listed as threatened are set forth at 50
CF.R. § 17.11 (1993).
Pursuant to 16 U.s.C §§ 1532(15) &: 1533(a)(2) (1988), the Fish and Wildlife Service (for the
Secretary of the Interior) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (for the Secretary
of Commerce) share responsibility for implementing and enforcing the provisiOns of the Endangered Species Act with respect to endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife.
See 50 CF.R. §§ 17.2(b), 17.11 (1993). Endangered and threatened marine species under the
jurisdiction of the NMFS are listed at 50 CF.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4 (1993). NMFS regulations
governing takings of protected terrestrial species under its jurisdiction are at 50 CF.R. §§
220.50-.53, 222.21-.28, and 227.11-.72 (1993). This article will analyze only Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations governing the taking of terrestrial endangered and threatened species of
fish and wildlife; NMFS regulations governing takings of endangered and threatened marine
species will not be analyzed in this article.
10. 16 U.S.C § 1534 (1988).
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species of.fish, wildlife and plants. 11 Section 71 2 of the Endangered
Species Act protects endangered and threatened species habitat, by
requiring each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species" which has been determined by the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to be "critical."13 Sections 9(a)(1)(B) and (C)14 of
the Endangered Species Act also make it illegal for any person to
"take" any listed endangered species of fish or wildlife within the
United States or the territorial sea of the United States or upon the
high seas. This prohibition of takings of endangered species has
been extended to threatened species of wildlife by Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations. 15
The Fish and Wildlife Service also adopted a regulation16 specifying that modification or degradation of the habitat of a listed
endangered or threatened species of wildlife constitutes, in certain
circumstances, "harm" (and therefore a "take") in violation of the Endangered Species Act,17 This regulation, however, leaves a number
of questions unanswered regarding when habitat modification constitutes "harm" in violation of the Endangered Species Act,18
A disagreement has recently occurred between United States
Courts of Appeals as to the validity of this Fish and Wildlife Service
regulation providing that modification or destruction of wildlife
habitat, in certain circumstances, can be a "harm" in violation of the
Endangered Species Act. In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that this regulation "serves the overall purpose of the Act" and "is also consistent with the policy of Congress
evidenced by the legislative history."19 In 1994, however, a divided
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation

11. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283-84 (D.D.C. 1992), aff d sub nom.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463
(D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6,
1995) (No. 94-859).
12. 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988).
13. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). See Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1467. See also infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
14. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B)-(q (1988).
15. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
16. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
17. See infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 162-229 and accompanying text.
19. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988).
See infra notes 207-58 and accompanying text.

1995]

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

159

defining "harm" to include habitat modification. 2o On January 6,
1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the federal government's petition for certiorari in this case to address the validity on its
face of the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation that makes significant habitat modification a prohibited taking under the Endangered
Species Act. 21
The question of whether under the Endangered Species Act a
prohibited "taking" of an endangered or threatened species of wildlife can include the modification or destruction of a protected species' habitat is significant because the Act's taking prohibition applies
to any person,22 including an individual, a corporation, and an officer, employee or agent of federal, state and local govemments,23 and
is enforced through civil penalties,24 criminal penalties,25 and injunctive relief. 26 If the Act's prohibition on the "taking" of listed endangered and threatened species applies to habitat modification in
certain circumstances, the Act's taking prohibition will in many cases
prohibit development of private land that serves as habitat for an endangered or threatened species of wildlife, unless the person either
qualifies for an exemption from the Act's taking prohibition,27 or
such prohibition constitutes a taking of private property without just

20. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190
(D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). See infra notes 322-461
and accompanying text. In 1993 this panel held, in a preenforcement challenge, that the Fish
and Wildlife Service's regulation defining "harm" was not facially void for vagueness and was
not invalid in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d
190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859); see infra notes 261320 and accompanying text. However, the panel granted a petition for rehearing and, based
on Judge Stephen Williams changing his position, invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service's
definition of "harm" which included habitat modification. 17 F.3d at 1465, 1472.
Later in 1994, the divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition for rehearing, 30
F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994); the en bane United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion for rehearing en banco rd.
21. Babbitt V. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Oral arguments are scheduled for April 17, 1995.
22. 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(q (1988).
23. The Endangered Species Act defines "person" to mean "an individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
16 US.C. § 1532(13) (1988).
24. ld. at § 154O(a). See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
25. 16 US.c. § 154O(b) (1988). See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
26. 16 US.c. §§ 154O(e)(6), (g) (1988). See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes SO-85 and accompanying text.
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compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 28
This article will first analyze provisions of the Endangered Species Act that make it illegal for any person to "take" any endangered
species of fish or wildlife, and the Fish and Wildlife Service regulations that make it illegal for any person to "take" any threatened
species of wildlife. The article then analyzes exemptions under the
Act and the Fish and Wildlife Service regulations from the general
prohibitions on taking any endangered or threatened species of wildlife. Also, this section discusses the Ads enforcement of the taking
prohibitions through civil penalties, criminal penalties, and injunctive relief.
After comparing the protection of wildlife habitat provided by
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with habitat protection provided by the Act's taking prohibitions, this article analyzes the Fish
and Wildlife Service regulations that define when a "take" occurs.
This section of the article focuses particularly on when modification
or destruction of a listed endangered or threatened species' habitat
constitutes a "take." This section of the article identifies situations
where uncertainty exists in determining when modification or alteration of a wildlife habitat constitutes a "take" in violation of these
regulations; also, various interpretations of the regulations are
suggested. These suggested interpretations may be adopted by the
Fish and Wildlife Service as formal amendments to their regulations.
This adoption would give more guidance to courts and persons subject to regulation under the Endangered Species Act and further the
Act's purposes. 29
.

28. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). See also Patricia A. Hageman, Comment, Fifth. Amendment
Takings Issues Raised by Section' 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375
(1994); see also Michelle Desiderio, The ESA: Facing Hard Truths and Advocating Responsible
Refonn, 8 NAT. REsoUkCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 37, 80-81. This article will not analyze the
issue of when a prohibition on land development or habitat modification, under the
Endangered Species Act's "takings" provision, constitutes a taking of private property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
29. An alternative to adopting formal amendments to Fish and Wildlife Service regulations would be pre-land development rulings by the Fish and Wildlife Service as to whether a
specific use or development of a particular parcel of private or public land would "take" a
listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife by destroying or modifying wildlife habitat.
See Steven P. Quarles et aI., The Unsettled Law of ESA Takings, 8 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T,
Summer 1993, at 10, 61. There are "several practicable difficulties with this approach." Id.
Consequently, formal amendment of the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation defining when a
"take" occurs under the Endangered Species Act, through notice-and-comment procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 553 (1988), is a preferable approach for providing
the public and the courts with guidance as to when modification of wildlife habitat constitutes
a "take" in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Such guidance might be provided by the
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Finally, this article analyzes the opinions of the Ninth Circuit and
District of Columbia Courts of Appeal that have addressed the
validity of the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation defining when
"harm" (and therefore a "take") occur~ under the Endangered Species
Act. The article concludes that the Fish and W~dlife Service regulation defining "harm" is not facially void for vagueness in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court should uphold
the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation as a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the Endangered Species Act,
using the standard of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council. 3O
II. PRoHIBmoNS ON TAKINGS OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED
SPEOES

Except as provided in two provisions of the Endangered Species
Act,31 section 9(a)(1)(B)32 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
makes it unlawful for any person,33 within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States, to take endangered species34 of
fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 435 of the Act. 36 Section 9

Fish and Wildlife Service stating "informally that it will not prosecute some types of land use
activities as takings." Quarles et al., supra, at 61.
30. 467 US. 837 (1984).
31. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1535(g)(2), 1539 (1988). See infra notes 50-85 and accompanying text.
32 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988).
33. "Person" is defined under the Act by 16 US.c. § 1532(13) (1988). See supra note 23.
American Indians are within the Act's definition of "person." United States v. Billie, 667 F.
Supp. 1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Enforcement of the Act's taking prohibition against a state, a
state agency, and a state employee does not violate either the Tenth or Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F.
Supp. 985 (0. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
34. "Endangered species" is defined under the Act by 16 US.c. § 1532(6) (1988). See supra
note 8.
35. 16 US.c. § 1533 (1988).
36. Section 9(1)(q of the Endangered Species Act. 16 US.c. § 1538(a)(1)(q (1988), also
makes it unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take upon
the high seas any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed under section 4 of the Act, id. at §
1533 (1988), except as provided in 16 US.C. §§ 1535(g)(2) &: 1539.
The Endangered Species Act. however, does not make it illegal for a person to "take" an
endangered plant species that has been listed under section 4 of the Act. Section 9(a)(2)(B), 16
U.S.c. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988), of the Act, as implemented by Fish and Wildlife Service regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 17.61(c)(1) (1993), however, makes it illegal, except as provided in 16 U.S.c. §
1535(g)(2) or 16 US.c. § 1539, for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
remove and reduce to possession any listed endangered species of plants:
from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such
species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such
species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any
State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law.
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only prohibits the taking of endangered species of fish and wildlife,
not the taking of threatened species of fish and wildlife. The Fish
and Wildlife Service, however, has adopted a regulation37 that provides, subject to some exceptions, that it is unlawful for any person
to take any listed threatened species of wildlife.
The Fish and Wildlife Service adopted this regulation on the
basis of authority provided by section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act, which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species ..., the
Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The
Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened
species any act prohibited under section 1S38(a)(1) of this title, in
the case of fish or wildlife ....38

The Fish and Wildlife Service through regulation39 "established a
regime in which the prohibitions established for endangered species
are extended automatically to all threatened species by a blanket rule
and then withdrawn as appropriate by special rule for particular
species and by permit in particular situations."4O This regulation wa~
challenged in Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt41 (Sweet Home 1), on two 7
grounds: first, that section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act requires the Fish and Wildlife Service to extend the Act's endangered
species prohibitions to threatened species only on a species-byspecies basis; and, second, that the Fish and Wildlife Service can

This provision makes it illegal to remove an endangered plant species from private land only if
a person knowingly violates state law or violates a state trespass law in doing so. Subject to
some exceptions, the prohibition on removing and reducing to possession endangered plants
from an area under Federal jurisdiction, has been extended to threatened plants. 50 C.F.R. §
17.71(a) (1993). This article will only analyze the Endangered Species Act's prohibitions on the
taking of endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife.
37. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993).
38. 16 U.S.c. § 1533(d) (1988).
39. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993).
40. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,5 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17
F.3d 1463 (O.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (O.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714
aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The Fish and Wildlife Service regulation generally prohibits the
taking of threatened species of wildlife, "except as provided in subpart A of this part, or in a
permit issued under ... subpart [0]." 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). The Fish and Wildlife Service
"actually issued special rules for a substantial number of the fish and wildlife species listed as
threatened." See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-48. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 7. In addition,
Fish and Wildlife Service permits under 50 c.F.R. § 17.32 authorizing the taking of threatened
species of wildlife "are more readily available" than are permits under 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22-.23
authorizing the taking of endangered species of wildlife. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1
F.3d at 7. This article will not further discuss these special rules, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (1993),
which authorize certain takings of specific threatened species.
41. 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on petition for reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (O.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g
denied, 30 F.3d 190 (O.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
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extend the Act's endangered species prohibitions to a threatened species of wildlife only after making a specific and formal finding and
explanation that such an extension was "necessary and· advisable II
within the meaning of the first sentence of section 4(d) of the Act. 42
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia rejected both of these arguments in Sweet Home I. This
panel upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation generally
prohibiting the taking of all listed threatened species of wildlife lias a
reasonable interpretation of the statute, II "in light of the substantial
deference II the court owes the agency under the principles of Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 43 The court stated
that "[t]he statute does not unambiguously compel the agency to
expand regulatory protection for threatened species only by promulgating regulations that are specific to individual species."44 The
panel also held that the Fish and Wildlife Service was not required to
make a "necessary and advisable" finding before promulgating the
regulation on the grounds that lithe two sentences of § lS33(d) represent separate grants of authority. The second sentence gives the
[Fish and Wildlife Service] discretion to apply any or all of the §
lS38(a)(l) prohibitions to threatened species without obligating it to
support such actions with findings of necessity."45
A. Definition of II Take II Under the Endangered Species Act

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 defines "take" to mean lito
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 46 This broad

42.
43.

See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 5-6.
467 U.S. 837 (1984). See infra notes 238-40, 392-96, 453 and

accompanying text.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 6. The panel reviewed the singular vs. plural
issue in 16 U.s.c. § 1533(d) (1988), and legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, and
concluded that "the possible conflict" between the Senate and House Reports on the Endangered Species Act and "apparent inconsistency within [16 U.S.c. § 1533(d») itself as to singular
and plural, shows the perils of attempting to use ambiguous legislative history to clarify ambiguous words within statutes." 1 F.3d at 6.
45. 1 F.3d at 7-8. The panel stated that "[o)nIy the first sentence of § 1533(d) contains the
'necessary and advisable' language and mandates formal individualized findings. This sentence requires the [Fish and Wildlife Service) to issue whatever other regulations are 'necessary
and advisable: including regulations that impose protective measures beyond those contained
in § 1538(a)(1)." Id. at 8.
46. 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19) (1988). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations also define "take" in
this manner. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1993). Acourt will engage in de novo judicial review of a claim
that certain conduct constitutes a "take" in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act
when the takings claim does not involve an examination of the consultation process between a
federal agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service under section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988). See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991)
(dictum).
44.
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definition seemingly does not require that an animal be killed. The
Act's definition of "take" also does not, on its face, require that a person know, or have reason to know, that their conduct will "take" a
listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife. Although the
Act does not define any of the terms included within the Act's definition of "take, II the Fish and Wildlife Service has promulgated regulations47 defining the terms "harass" and "harm" in the Act's definition
of II take. II These Fish and Wildlife Service regulations define "harm"
to include "significant habitat modification or. degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 48
The Service's definitions of "harm" and "harass" are analyzed later in
this article49 following analysis of exemptions from the Act's takings
prohibitions, enforcement of the Act's takings prohibitions, and comparison of habitat protection under sections 7 and 9 of the Act.
B. Exemptions from the Act's Takings Prohibitions

"Congress has drawn several extraordinarily narrow exceptions
to the Act's prohibitions." 50 Although section 9(a)(1)51 contains explicit exceptions to the general prohibitions on taking endangered species of fish or wildlife under 16 U.s.c. §§ 1535(g)(2) and 1539, Fish
and Wildlife Service regulations and other provisions of the Act contain additional exceptions.52 There are several provisions of the Act

47. 50 CF.R. § 17.3 (1993).
48. [d.
49. See infra notes 128-229 and accompanying

text.
50. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
51. 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(1) (1988).
52. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations provide that notwithstanding the general prohibitions on the takings of endangered and threatened species, "any person may take endangered [or threatened wildlife] in defense of his own life or the lives of others." 50 CF.R. §§
17.21(c)(2), .31(a) (1993). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations also authorize permits for
takings of endangered and threatened species of wildlife "to prevent undue economic hardship." 50 CF.R. §§ 17.23, .32(a) (1993). These regulations arguably are authorized by 16 U.s.C
§ 1540(f) (1988), which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to promulgate such regulations
as may be appropriate to enforce" the Endangered Species Act. Similarly, a person who acts
"on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her
family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endangered or threatened species"
is exempt from civil penalties, 16 U.S.C § 1540(a)(3) (1988), and criminal penalties, id. §
1540(b)(3), for illegally taking an endangered or threatened species of fish or wildlife. Fish and
Wildlife Service special rules, 50 CF.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (1993), authorize takings of specific
threatened species under certain circumstances. See supra note 40.
In addition, the Secretary of the Interior's authority to "issue such regulations as he deems
necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of" listed threatened species, 16 U.S.C
§ 1533(d) (1988), and the Act's definition of "conservation"-which "in the extraordinary case
where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may
include regulated taking," id. § 1532(3) - permit the secretary to issue regulations authorizing
the taking of a threatened species if he has determined that "population pressures within ...
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which may exempt a person, engaging in land development activities that modify or destroy wildlife habitat, from the Act's prohibitions on takings.
First, the Secretary of the Interior may permit a taking of wildlife,
otherwise prohibited by section 9(a)(1)(B)53 of the Act, "if such taking
is incidental to, and not [for] the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity."54 To obtain an incidental takings permit,
a person must submit a habitat conservation plan (HCP) to the Fish
and Wildlife Service that will minimize and mitigate the impacts of

[the animal's] ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved." Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 613
(8th Cir. 1985) (dictum). See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Turner, No. CIV. A. 91-2201 (MB), 1991
WL 206232 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,1991); Note, The Taking a/Threatened Species Under the Endangered
Species Act: Fund for Animals v. Turner, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 109 (1993).
Under section 10(e), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(e) (1988), of the Endangered Species Act, any Indian,
Aleut, or Eskimo who is an Alaskan Native residing in Alaska, "and any non-native permanent
resident of an Alaskan native village," is not subject to the Endangered Species Act's prohibitions on the taking of endangered or threatened species, "if such taking is primarily for subsistence purposes," id. § 1539(e)(1), and is not "accomplished in a wasteful manner." [d. §
1539(e)(2). This exemption does "not apply to any non-native resident of an Alaskan native
village found by the Secretary to be not primarily dependent upon the taking of fish and wildlife for consumption or for the creation and sale of authentic native articles of handicrafts and
clothing." [d. § 1539(e)(1). The Secretary of the Interior or Commerce may regulate such subsistence takings wherever the Secretary determines "that such taking materially and negatively
affects the threatened or endangered species." ld. at § 1539(e)(4). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.5 (1993).
While one court held that the Act's prohibitions on takings are not applicable to other Indians
who take endangered or threatened species on an Indian reservation for non-commercial purposes pursuant to treaty rights, United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc), rro'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), another court has held that Indians are
exempt from the Act's prohibition on takings only to the extent provided in 16 U.S.c. § 1539(e).
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
Section 10(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (1988), of the Endangered Species Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to issue permits authorizing otherwise prohibited takings of endangered or threatened species of wildlife "for scientific purposes or to
enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species, including, but not limited to, acts
necessary for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations pursuant to [16
U.S.c. § 15390) (1988)]." See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(a), .32(a) (1993).
Fish and Wildlife Service regulations authorize certain federal and state employees and
agents, when acting within the scope of their official duties, to take endangered and threatened
species without a permit, "to aid a sick, injured, or orphaned specimen," to "dispose of a dead
specimen," to "(s]alvage a dead specimen which may be useful for scientific study," or to
"remove specimens which pose a demonstrable but nonimmediate threat to human safety." 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(3), .21(c)(4), .31(a) (1993). In addition, qualified employees or agents of a
state conservation agency that have a "Cooperative Agreement with the Fish and Wildlife
Service in accordance with section 6(c) [16 U.s.c. § 1535(c) (1988)] of the Act," are authorized to
take endangered or threatened species under the agreement for conservation purposes. 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(5), .31(b) (1993). These regulations apparently are based upon authority conferred on the Secretary of the Interior under 16 U.S.c. § 1540(f) (1994) to promulgate regulations needed to enforce the Act.
53. 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
54. [d. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations regarding the permits for
endangered species of wildlife are at 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) (1993). The Fish and Wildlife Service
has adopted regulations authorizing permits for incidental taking of threatened species of
wildlife. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b) (1993).
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such incidental taking to the maximum extent practicable. The Fish
and Wildlife Service must also find that lithe taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild. 1I55 Although a section 10 incidental takings permit may allow land development to modify or destroy wildlife
habitat, development of an Hep can be expensive, complicated and
time-consuming.56
Notwithstanding the Act's prohibitions against taking endangered and threatened species of wildlife, any taking that complies
with the specific terms and conditions of a written statement under
section 7(b)(4)(C)(iv)57 is not lIa prohibited taking. 1I58 The Fish and
Wildlife Service must provide a written statement to a federal agency
when the Service, after consultation with the agency pursuant to
section 7(a)(2)59 of the Act:
concludes that(A) the agency action will not violate such subsection, or offers reasonable and prudent alternatives which the Secretary believes
would not violate such subsection;
(B) the taking of an endangered species or a threatened species incidental to the agency action would not violate such subsection; and

55. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1988). "Section 10(a) provides procedural means by
which to improve the trade-off between protecting endangered species and permitting normal
development. Firms whose activities might incidentally 'take' members of an endangered
species can get advanced protection from legal liability, but only if they convince the Secretary
that the plan uses the maximum devices possible to mitigate and minimize species loss, and
that the resulting losses will not unduly harm the species. See § 10(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (iv), 16 U.S.c.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (iv)." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1468 (D.c. Cir. 1994)
(Sweet Home II), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Uan. 6,
1995) (No. 94-859). The majority in Sweet Home II concluded that an "incidental taking" for
which a permit can be issued under section 10(a)(I)(B) of the Act does not include "significant
habit!1t modification injurious to wildlife." Id. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
The dissent in Sweet Home II argued that an "incidental taking" under section 10(a)(I)(8) can
include habitat modification that constitutes a "take" under 50 c.F.R. § 17.3. 17 F.3d at 1477
(Mikva, C.]., dissenting). See infra notes 428-31 and accompanying text.
56. See Robert D. Thornton, The Search for a Conservation Planning Paradigm: Section 10 of
the ESA, 8 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 21 [hereinafter Thornton, Conservation
Planning Paradigm]; Robert D. Thornton, Takings Under Endangered Species Act Section 9,4 NAT.
REsoURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1990, at 7, 9, 50 [hereinafter Thornton, Takings].
Habitat conservation plans for section 10(a) incidental take permits can cover "large tracts
of land. . .. The plan to protect the California gnatcatcher, for example, covers 3.8 million
acres." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
714 Uan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
57. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4)(Q(iv) (1988).
58. Id. at § 1536(0)(2).
59. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). See infra notes 114-27, 340-56 and accompanying text.
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(C) if an endangered or threatened species of a marine mammal is
involved, the taking is authorized pursuant to [16 U.S.c. §

1371(a)(5)].6O

The statement must specify the terms and conditions that the federal
agency, applicant, or both, must comply with to implement specified
reasonably prudent measures, minimizing the incidental taking. The
statement must also adopt necessary measures to comply with 16
U.S.c. § 1371(a)(5) regarding marine mammals.61
This "exemption," however, can only be triggered by a section 7
consultation. Conversely, a section 7 consultation requires some
federal agency action. Thus, before a private landowner can take a
listed species under section 7, there must be a "nexus between the
proposed taking and a federal agency action."62 This nexus only
exists if the private landowner's taking results from an "action
authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal agency.63 Furthermore, this exemption does not apply to a taking, resulting from an
existing physical condition, that is the subject of an incidental taking
statement under section 7(b)(4) of the Act. 64
To qualify for this exemption, a federal "agency must obtain an
incidental taking statement before it takes the protected species." 65 A
Fish and Wildlife Service statement "does not retroactively excuse
the takings that occurred before the Secretary [of the Interior] issued
the statement. 1166 However, if a federal agency can show that it subsequently obtained authorization from the Fish and Wildlife Service
and complied with the requirements of a section 7(b)(4) incidental
taking statement, a court should lift an injunction against the agency
action constituting a taking under the Endangered Species ACt. 67
When federal agency action or private action is authorized or
funded by a federal agency,68 section 7(0)(1) provides an alternate
method of exempting land development activities. 69 Section 7(0)(1)
provides that, notwithstanding the Act's prohibitions, any exempt

60. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4) (1988).
61. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(Q. Regulations implementing this exemption are at 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(i) (1993).
62. Thornton, Takings, supra note 56, at 8.
63. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). See Deborah L. Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7
Consultlltions over Existing Projects, 8 NAT. REsoURCES &: ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 17, 17-18; see
also infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
64. See Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 937 (D. Mont. 1992).
65. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989).
66.Id.
67.Id.
68. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 114-27, 340-56 and
accompanying text.
69. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(0)(1) (1988).
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action under section 7(h)10 of the Act "shall not be considered to be a
taking of any endangered or threatened species with respect to any
activity which is necessary to carry out such action." 71 The Endangered Species Committee (the so-called "God Squad" 72) is required to
issue exemptions under 7(h) if it makes determinations that: "there
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action "; the
action's benefits "clearly outweigh" the benefits of alternative courses
of action "consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat,
and such action is in the public interest "; and the action is regionally
or nationally significant.73 An additional finding that the Committee
must make in order to be required to issue a section 7(h) exemption
is that the action "establishes such reasonable mitigation and
enhancement measures ... as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered
species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned." 74 The
Committee, however, has granted only a few exemptions under
section 7(h).75
In states that are parties to cooperative agreements under section
6(c)16 of the Endangered Species Act, land development modifying
wildlife habitat may be exempted, under sections 4( d) and
6(g)(2)(A),77 from the Act's takings prohibitions. Where the habitat

70. Id. § 1536(h).
71. Id. § 1536(0)(1).
72. Wm. Robert Irvin, The Endangered Species Act: Keeping Every Cog and Wheel, 8 NAT.
REsoURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 36, 39.
73. Id. § 1536(h)(I)(A). Section 7(p), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(p) (1988), authorizes the President,
when acting under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.s.c. § 5121, to
make the determinations required by sections 7(g) and (h), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(g) & (h) (1988), for
any project repairing or replacing a public facility in a designated major disaster area, "which
the President determines (1) is necessary to prevent the recurrence of such a natural disaster
and to reduce the potential loss of human life, and (2) to involve an emergency situation which
does not allow the ordinary procedures of [section 7] to be followed." The Committee is
required to accept the President's determinations under section 7(p). 16 U.s.c. § 1536(p)
(1988).
74. Id. § 1536(h)(I)(B). Regulations governing issuance of exemptions by the Endangered
Species Committee are at 50 C.F.R. §§ 450.01-453.06 (1993).
Section 70), 16 U.S.c. § 15360) (1988), alternatively provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of [the Endangered Species Act], the Committee shall grant an exemption for
any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is necessary for
reasons of national security." See 50 C.F.R. § 453.03(d) (1993).
Section 7(i), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(i) (1988), prohibits the Committee "from considering for
exemption any application" for proposed agency action if the Secretary of State, after follOWing
prescribed procedures, certifies in writing to the Committee that the granting of the exemption
and the implementation of the action would violate an international treaty or commitment of
the United States.
75. As of the summer of 1993, the Committee had met only three times during the nearly
15 years of section 7(h)'s existence. Irvin, supra note 72, at 36, 40.
76. 16 U.S.c. § lS35(c) (1988).
77. Id. §§ 1533(d), 1535(g)(2)(A).
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modification is not an unlawful taking of an endangered or
threatened species under state law, the exemption may be nullified
by section 6(f)18 of the Act. Section 6(g)(2)(A) provides that prohibitions against the taking of endangered and threatened species:
shall not apply with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species or threatened species (other than species listed in
Appendix I to the Convention [on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed on March 3, 1973,
and the appendices thereto] or otherwise specifically covered by
any other treaty or Federal law) within any State(A) which is then a party to a cooperative agreement with the Secretary [of the Interior] pursuant to subsection (c) of this section
(except to the extent that the taking of any such species is contrary
to the law of such State) ... .79
Section 4(d) of the Act provides that Fish and Wildlife Service
regulations, regarding the taking of threatened resident species of
fish or wildlife, apply in any state that is party to a cooperative
agreement under section 1535(c) only to the extent that such regulations are incorporated into state law.so Such cooperative agreements
can be entered into by the Fish and Wildlife Service and a state
"which establishes and maintains an adequate and active program
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species. "81
Section 6(f) of the Act provides, however, that state laws or regulations governing the taking of endangered or threatened species
may be more restrictive than section 6(f) or the accompanying regulations, but may not be less restrictive.82 Furthermore, Swan View
Coalition, Inc. v. Turner8 3 held that section 6(f) of the Act means that
state takings provisions for a member of a section 6(c) cooperative
agreement are preempted when the state's definition of take does not
include "harm" and "significant habitat modification." The court in
Swan View Coalition consequently held that the Endangered Species
Act's "take" prohibitions, which include "harm" and "significant habitat modification/, were applicable in a state that is party to a section

78. [d. § 1535(1).
79. [d. § 1535(g)(2)(A).
80. [d. § 1533(d). See Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (0. Mont.
1992).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1) (1988). A state which has entered into such a cooperative
agreement is eligible for federal assistance covering up to 90% of the estimated program cost
stated in the agreement. [d. § 1535(d).
82. [d. § 1535(1). Any less restrictive state law is preempted by section 6(1) of the Act. See
United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Swan
View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992).
83. 824 F. Supp. at 938.

,. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

170

[Vol. 10:2

6(c) cooperative agreement but that has a less restrictive state takings
prohibition.84
This holding in Swan View Coalition means that section 6(f) of the
Endangered Species Act nullifies any exemption from the Act's takings prohibitions provided under section 6(g)(2)(A) or section 4(d),
because Swan View Coalition's interpretation of section 6(f) requires
that a state's definition of "take" mirror the definition of "take" under
the Endangered Species Act and Fish and Wildlife Service regulations. If section 6(f) requires a state's taking law to be the same as
federal takings prohibitions, under the Endangered Species Act,
neither section 6(g)(2) nor section 4(d) of the Act can make the federal prohibitions regarding taking endangered or threatened species
through "significant habitat modification" inapplicable in a cooperative agreement state.85
C.

Enforcement of the Prohibitions on Takings

The Endangered Species Act enforces its prohibitions on the takings of endangered and threatened species through civil penalties,
criminal penalties, and injunctive relief.86 "The Endangered Species
Act does not expressly condition the enforcement of the prohibition
on taking a protected species to takings occurring after the agency
adopts a recovery plan, identifies critical habitat or issues protective
regulations."87 Furthermore, completion of an environmental impact
statement, in compliance with section 102(2)(C)88 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, is not a prerequisite to enforcement
of the Endangered Species Act's prohibitions on takings. 89
Any person who knowingly violates the Endangered Species
Act's prohibitions regarding the taking of an endangered species, or
any permits or implementing regulations issued under the Act, is
subject a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation9o and
criminal penalties of a fine, imprisonment, or both.91 Any person

84. Id.

85. Furthermore, a person's state water law rights do not exempt a person from the Endangered Species Act's prohibition on takings. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788
F. Supp. at 1134.
86. See Eileen Sobeck. Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Summer 1993, at 30.
87. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1134-35.
88. 42 U.S.c. § 4332(q (1988).
89. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1135.
90. 16 U.S.c. § 1540(a)(l) (1988).
91. Id. § 1540(b)(1}. The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act and the 1987 Criminal Fines
Improvement Act, 18 U.S.c. §§ 3559(a}(6}, 3571(b}, (e) (1988 & Supp. 1993), increased the maximum criminal penalties for each violation under the Endangered Species Act, to a $100,000
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who knowingly violates the Fish and Wildlife Service regulations 92
prohibiting the taking of a threatened species of fish or wildlife is
subject to assessment of a civil penalty by the Secretary of the
Interior or Commerce of up to $12,000 for each violation93 and
criminal penalties of a fine or imprisonment. 94 An individual could
escape civil or criminal penalties by demonstrating "a good faith
belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of
his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from
any endangered or threatened species."95
The Endangered Species Act does not specify whether "knowingly" violating the prohibitions under the Act and Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations requires actual knowledge - at the time of the
taking-that the conduct constituted a prohibited taking under the
Act. Several courts have held, however, that a person only has to act
with a "general intent" to "knowingly" violate the Act's prohibitions
on takings. 96 Under this approach, a person "knowingly" takes a
protected species, for purposes of the Act's criminal penalty provisions, if the person's actions were voluntary and intentional and
not due to mistake or accident. 97 To "knowingly" violate the Act's
takings prohibitions the person does not have to know the particular
species or subspecies of the animal taken, know that the species
taken was listed under the Act as endangered or threatened, or know
that the Act applied to the lands where the taking occurred.98

fine, one year imprisonment, or both, for an individual, and to a $200,000 fine for a
corporation.
92. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 154O(a)(1) (1988).
94. Id. § 1540(b)(1). See supra note 9l.
95. Id. §§ 154O(a)(3), (b)(3).
96. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United States v. St.
Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988).
97. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1492.
98. Id. at 1492-94. The court in United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Mont.
1988), concluded that the interpretation of the Act in United States v. Billie was "supported by
the legislative history," id. at 1045, and stated that:
The critical issue is whether the act was done knowingly, not whether the defendant recOgnized what he was shooting. The scienter element applies to the act of
taking; thus defendant could only claim accident or mistake if he did not intend to
discharge his firearm, or the weapon malfunctioned, or similar circumstances
occurred.
Id. In St. Onge, the court found that the defendant's belief that he was shooting an elk would
not be a defense to a criminal charge of knowingly taking'a threatened grizzly bear in violation
of 16 U.s.c. § 154O(b)(1). 676 F. Supp. at 1044. The court also held in St. Onge that the
government, in order to convict the defendant of the charged crime, only had to prove that the
defendant knowingly took a grizzly bear and that the defendant had no federal permit to take
the bear. Id. at 1045.
Similarly, in United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant was
charged under the Endangered Species Act of the crime of knowing possession, importation,
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A person engaged in an activity that constitutes a prohibited taking under the Act can also be enjoined from taking a protected
species. Section l1(e)(6}99 of the Endangered Species Act provides
that "[t]he Attorney General of the United States may seek to enjoin
any person who is alleged to be in violation of any provision" of the
Act or any "regulation issued under authority thereof." This provision authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil suit, seeking
injunctive relief, against a person engaging in conduct that takes
endangered or threatened fish or wildlife in violation of the
Endangered Species Act.
In addition, "the [Endangered Species Act] provides a private
right of action to enjoin violations of the Act. "100 This citizen suit
provisionlOl authorizes any person, with standing, to enforce the Act
through injunctive relief by filing suit against any person alleged to
be in violation of any provision of the Act or regulation issued under
the ACt. l02 "Congress thus encouraged citizens to 'bring civil suits
... to force compliance with any provision of the Act.'''103 In order
for a person "to be in violation of" the Endangered Species Act's
takings prohibitions and subject to a citizen suit, the person must be
engaged in continuous, ongoing conduct that constitutes a prohibited taking, both at the time the citizen suit is filed and when the
citizen suit comes to triaP04

or attempting to possess a listed threatened species. The Fifth Circuit held that the legislative
history of section 11 of the Act, 16 u.s.c. § 1540 demonstrates Congress' intent to make its
violation "a general intent crime." Id. at 1018. The Fifth Circuit stated that Congress' purpose
is reflected in the 1978 amendment of 16 U.S.c. § 154O(b)(1) by substituting "knowingly" for
"willfully." 916 F.2d at 1018-19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26). "The committee explicitly stated that it did 'not intend
to make knowledge of the law an element of either civil penalty or criminal violations of the
Act.''' 916 F.2d at 1019 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit therefore held in Nguyen that the
government in a criminal prosecution under section 11 of the Act does not have to prove that
the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal, knew the species of the animal in question or
knew that the species was a listed threatened species. Id. at 1018.
Without supporting analysis or citations, one federal district court has stated in dictum
that 16 U.S.c. §§ 154O(a) and (b) require that the defendant knew that the conduct for which he
is assessed civil penalties or criminally prosecuted was unlawful. Sweet Home Chapter v.
Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d
1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on petition for reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d
190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
99. 16 U.S.c. § 154O(e)(6) (1988).
100. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989).
101. 16 U.S.c. § 154O(g)(1)(A) (1988).
102. Id. § 154O(g)(1).
103. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d at 1300 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 181 (1978».
104. Cf Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
(holding that § 505(a) of the Oean Water Act requires a good faith allegation of an ongoing
violation of the act).
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Courts differ as to the standard a court should follow in determining whether a permanent injunction should be issued against
conduct that constitutes a prohibited taking in violation of the Endangered Species Act. A number of courts hold that courts should
not engage in the traditional balancing of equities when an injunction is sought against conduct that constitutes a prohibited taking of
an endangered or threatened species. Following this approach, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a citizen suit seeking an
injunction against an alleged taking of an endangered species, that
courts do not have "their traditional equitable discretion in injunction proceedings of balancing the parties' competing interests,"
because Congress has determined under the Endangered Species Act
"that the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in
favor of protected species."105 One court followed this approach in
an Endangered Species Act citizen suit and issued an injunction
against a federal agency action, stating that "[w]hen an injunction is
sought under the . . . [Endangered Species Act], the traditional
balancing of equities is abandoned in favor of an almost absolute
presumption in favor of the endangered species."l06
Under this no-balancing-of-equities approach, a court would
grant an injunction if an action constitutes a prohibited taking of an
endangered species unless unusual circumstances exist "where the
ecological harm caused by ... granting ... [the] injunction would be
greater than if no injunction [was] issued." 107 Courts following this

105. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. RR, 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming denial of motion for preliminary injunction, but stating principles apparently
governing all injunction proceedings under the Endangered Species Act). The Ninth Circuit in
Burlington Northern Railroad, however, affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction against the railroad that would have required the railroad's trains to
reduce speed at locations where com had accidentally spilled, and to obtain an incidental
taking permit under section 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(B), although the railroad's trains
had struck and killed seven grizzly bears attracted to the spilled corn. Because the district
court found that the railroad's cleanup efforts had "substantially minimized" "the attractiveness of the com spill sites as food sources" and because "[tJhe fact that no bears have been
killed by BN trains in three years supports an inference that the cleanup was effective," the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not "clearly err" in denying the preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff "failed to establish the likelihood of irreparable
future injury." ld. at 1511. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
106. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1355 (D. Minn. 1988), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). In this case, the Eighth Circuit held that the district
court had properly enjOined the EPA from continuing registration of strychnine under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.c. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), when such registration constituted a prohibited taking of endangered species of wildlife.
882 F.2d at 1301. See infra note 167.
107. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985). In this
case, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior and the
Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service prohibiting the defendants from authorizing the
hunting of migratory birds with lead shot in certain areas, in part because this authorization
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approach take the position that because Congress intended to afford
endangered species 'lithe highest of priorities,"'l08 the United States is
entitled to an injunction against a prohibited taking of a threatened
species of wildlife in violation of the Act if injury to the species is
"likely and irreparable."l09 Similarly, a court held, in a citizen suit
seeking to enjoin a prohibited taking of an endangered species, that
when a taking creates "an actual present negative impact on the
[species'] population that threatens the continued existence and
recovery of the species. . . . [T]he Endangered Species Act leaves no
room for balancing policy considerations," and a court must order
cessation of the activity that constitutes the prohibited taking. 110
A court following this no-balancing-of-equities approach, however, "must look at the likelihood of future harm before deciding
whether to grant an injunction under the [Endangered Species
Act]."l11 To obtain an injunction against a person who allegedly will
continue to take a protected species in violation of the Act, the plaintiff "must prove that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the [Endangered Species Act]."112
Several courts, however, following the more traditional
balancing-of-equities approach, have held that in order for plaintiffs
to obtain a permanent injunction against a prohibited taking, lithe
[p]laintiffs must establish four facts: (1) actual success on the merits,
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm absent an injunction, (3)
that the irreparable harm threatened is greater than that caused by

constituted a prohibited taking of endangered bald eagles that were wounded or killed by lead
shot. See infra note 167.
108. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978». The court in Glenn-Colusa
enjoined an irrigation district from pumping water from the Sacramento River at a particular
facility during the threatened winter-run chinook salmon's peak downstream migration season. because that conduct constituted a prohibited taking of the salmon by killing salmon. 788
F. Supp. at 1135.
109. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1132.
110. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw.
1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit in Palila upheld the district court's
issuance of an injunction requiring the State of Hawaii to remove all mouflon sheep from the
critical habitat of the endangered palila bird species, because the presence of the mouflon
sheep in that habitat constituted "harm" and a "take" of the palila in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 852 F.2d at 1110; see infra notes 207-58 and accompanying text.
111. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994). See
supra note 105.
112. Id. Future harm of a protected species does not have to "be shown with certainty
before an injunction may issue: but "[t]he plaintiff must make a showing that a violation of the
[Endangered Species Act] is at least likely in the future." 1d. Although "a threat of extinction to
the species" is not required before an injunction may be issued under the Act, there must be "a
definitive threat of future harm to protected species, not mere speculation." 1d. at 1511 n.8.
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the public interest would be served by the

injunction." 113

III. PROTECIlON OF WILDLIFE HABITAT UNDER SECIlON 7 OF THE
ENDANGERED SPEOES Acr
In analyzing the issue of whether modification of wildlife habitat
is regulated under the Endangered Species Act's takings prohibitions, the regulation of habitat modification under section 71 14 of the
Act should be considered. Section 7 of the Act can prohibit federal
agency action that will destroy or modify the habitat of endangered
or threatened species of fish or wildlife. 1l5 Section 7(a)(2)1l6 of the
Endangered Species Act provides:

Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce], insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary ... to be critical, unless such agency has been granted an
exemption for such action by the [Endangered Species] Committee
pursuant to subsection (h) of this section.... 117

113. Sierra Qub v. Lyng. 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1277 (E.O. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in

part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Qub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Sierra
Qub v. Lujan. 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1554 (W.O. Tex. 1993) (quoting Lyng's four
facts). In Lyng, the court issued a pennanent injunction against certain national forest
management practices of the United States Forest Service, which were found to be a taking in
violation of the Endangered Species Act as well as in violation of section 7, 16 U.S.c. § 1536, of
the Act. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text. The Lyng court issued the penn anent
injunction on the grounds that otherwise irreparable hann would result to an endangered
species of woodpecker that was on the "verge of extinction" because of a "steadily declining
population,." that "the harm to the woodpecker through extinction would outweigh any harm
caused by [the] injunction,." and "that the public interest ... [would) be served by the attempt
to preserve [the) species." 694 F. Supp. at 1277. The court in Lujan ordered the Texas Water
Commission to prepare a plan to assure that withdrawals of water from groundwater would
not cause spring flow levels in two springs to drop below levels that result in endangered and
threatened species being taken in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 36 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 1558.
114. 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988).
115. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978); Sierra Qub v. Marsh, 816
F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. 16 U.s.c. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
117. Section 7 of "[t)he Act prescribes a three-step process to ensure compliance" by
federal agencies with section 7(a)(2)'s "substantive provisions," with each of the first two steps
serving "a screening function to determine if the successive steps are required." Thomas v.
Peterson,. 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). These three procedural "steps" are:
I) A federal agency shall inquire of the Fish and Wildlife Service whether any threatened or
endangered species "may be present" in the area of the agency's proposed action. 16 U.S.c. §
1536(c)(I) (1988).
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Section 7(a)(2) only applies to action authorized, funded or
carried out by a federal agency;118 it consequently does not apply to
private action or state or local government actions that are not
authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency.119 The Endangered Species Act's prohibitions regarding taking endangered
and threatened species of fish and wildlife, however, apply to any
person, including private individuals, corporations, states, municipalities, state political subdivisions, and employees and agents of the
federal government, a state, a municipality, or a political subdivision
of a state.120
Although federal agency action that destroys or
adversely modifies a protected species' habitat may violate section
7(a)(2)'s prohibition of actions that "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species,"l21 this prohibition only applies to actions that may kill

all

members of the

endangered or threatened sp~cies (resulting in the species becoming
extinct).122 The Act's general prohibition of taking endangered or

2) Preparation by the agency of a biological assessment if the Secretary finds that a
threatened or endangered species may be present. The biological assessment, which may be
part of an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.c. § 4332(2)(C) (1988), is to be conducted "for the
purpose of identifying any endangered species or threatened species which is likely to be
affected by such action." 16 U.S.c. § 1S36(c)(1) (1988).
3) Formal consultation by the agency with the Fish and Wildlife Service if the biological
assessment determines that a threatened or endangered species "is likely to be affected" by the
agency action. [d. § 1536(a)(2). Following this formal consultation, the Fish and Wildlife
Service is required to issue a "biological" "opinion ... detailing how the agency action affects
the species or its critical habitat." 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the biological opinion concludes
that the proposed agency action would jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify its
critical habitat, then'the agency action would violate 16 U.S.c. § 1536(a)(2) and cannot be
undertaken unless the Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to its duty under 16 U.S.c. §
1536(b)(3)(A) (1988), has suggested a reasonable and prudent alternative which it believes the
agency or applicant can take without violating section 7(a)(2) of the Act. Thomas v. Peterson,
753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). If the biological opinion concludes that the agency action will
not violate section 7(a)(2), the Fish and Wildlife Service may under 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4)(ii)(iii) require reasonable and prudent measures to minimize takings of endangered or
threatened species incidental to the agency action. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 763. The
National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service have adopted jOint
regulations that interpret and implement sections 7(a)-(d), 16 U.s.c. § 1536(a)-(d) (1988), of the
Endangered Species Act. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.01-.16 (1993). See Freeman, supra note 63, at 17;
William H. Satterfield et aI., JNho's Afraid of the Big Bad Beach Mouse, 8 NAT. RESOURCFS &
ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 13.
118. See Proffitt v. Dep't of Interior ex reI. Lujan, 825 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.O. Ky. 1993).
119. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 37-38.
120. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
121. See Sierra Oub v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156, 171-72, 174 (1978) (finding that
section 7 will be violated by a federal agency project that extinguishes the existence of an entire
species). Joint regulations of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife
Service~ which interpret and implement section 7(a)(2), define "Uleopardize the continued
existence of' to mean "to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or
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threatened species of fish or wildlife is violated, however, when only
one animal within the species is killed or otherwise taken,l23 even if
the species' continued existence is not jeopardized by the killing of
one or a few members of the endangered or threatened species.124
Section 7(a)(2)'s alternative prohibition of federal agency action
that may result in the destruction or modification of critical habitatl25
of an endangered species only applies when the habitat has been
determined critical by the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce.126

indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction. numbers, or distribution of that species." 50
CF.R § 402.02 (1993).
123. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981) (codified
at 50 CF.R § 17.3) (redefining "harm" within the meaning of "take" under the Endangered Species Act) (stating that "section 9's threshold does focus on individual members of a protected
species").
124. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D.
Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the population of an endangered
species does not have "to dip closer to extinction before the [takings] prohibitions of section 9
come into force").
125. "Critical habitat" for a threatened or endangered species is defined to mean:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the
time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section [4 of the Act, 16 U.S.C
§ 1533 (1988)] ..., on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed ..., upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the
species.
16 U.S.C § 1532(5)(A) (1988). Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined by Judge Sentelle
in support of denial of appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17
F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714
Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, stated that section
7(a}(2)'s prohibition of the federal government's "destruction or adverse modification of habitat
... which is determined ... to be critical," "seems to be simply another way of referring to
habitat modifications so Significant to the species that they might lead to death (or at least
some very serious injury) for members of the species." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d
190,192 (D.C Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995)
(No. 94-859).
126. Procedures for designation of critical habitat for endangered and threatened species
are set forth in 16 U.S.C §§ 1533(a}(3), (b)(2), (b)(6}(c) (1988) and in SO CF.R. §§ 424.01-.21
(1993). Areas that have been listed as critical habitat are set forth at 50 CF.R § 17.95 (fish and
wildlife) and § 17.96 (plants) (1993). The areas listed in § 17.95 (fish and wildlife) and § 17.96
(plants) and referred to in the lists at §§ 17.11 and 17.12 have been determined by the Director
to be "Critical Habitats". Id. at § 17.94 (a). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations specify that
"[al11 Federal agencies must insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by them
is not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of the constituent elements
essential to the conservation of the listed species within these defined Critical Habitats." rd.
Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined in by Judge Sentelle in support of denial of
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir.
1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, concluded that "[iln looking at the
Department's regulations [SO CF.R. § 17.94 (1993)] discussing modifications of 'critical' habitat
under § 7, and habitat modifications that are forbidden under the Department's view of § 9, we
are unable to discern any substantive, operational difference, and the government has not
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Consequently, if section 9's takings prohibitions can be violated by
habitat modification, its takings prohibitions can extend to habitat
modifications by private individuals, corporations and state and
local governments that are not authorized or funded by a federal
agency, and to habitat modification that only kills or injures a single
or a few animals within a protected species-habitat modifications
that can not be prohibited under section 7(a)(2).127
IV. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE'S 1975 REGULATION DEFINING
"HARM" AND "HARASS"

A. History of the Regulation

In 1975, the Fish and Wildlife Service adopted a regulation,
which is still in effect, that defines "harass" (in the Endanger:ed
Species Act's definition of "take") to mean:
[A]n intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to

identified any . . . . . If there are 'essential' habitat elements whose removal or destruction
causes no injury, the government cites no example and it is hard to imagine one. II Sweet Home
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d at 192 (statement of Williams, J.) (citations omitted).
127. See Comment, What Does It TR1ce to TR1ce and What Does It Take to Jeopardize? A
Comparative Analysis of the Standards Embodied in Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 7
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (1993). The Endangered Species Act's only remedy for a violation of
section 7's substantive provisions, or a substantial violation of section 7's procedural requirements, is issuance by a court, without the traditional balancing of equities, of an injunction
against the action. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Thomas v. Peterson,
753 F.2d 754 (9th Or. 1985); Sierra Oub v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987). The
Endangered Species Act does not impose civil penalties or criminal punishment upon persons
violating section 7 of the Act. although persons who violate the Act's prohibitions or takings of
endangered and threatened species are subject to civil penalties and criminal punishment. See
supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined in by Judge Sentelle in support of denial of
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir.
1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, states that:
Michael Bean, Senior Counsel for the Environmental Def~nse Fund, recOgnized
the virtual identity between what the Senate deleted from § 9 and what it retained
in § 7 when he wrote, not long after the Act passed, "if "taking' [sic] comprehends
habitat destruction, then it is at least doubtful whether section 7 of the Act is even
necessary." MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 397
(1977). But see MICHAEL}. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 342
(Revised &t Expanded Edition 1983).
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement by Williams, J.),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995)(No. 94-859). This analysis by Judge Williams ignores
the differences between sections 9 and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act discussed in this
section of the article. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 345-56
and accompanying text.
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significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering.l28

When the Fish and Wildlife Service adopted this definition of
"harass" on September 26, 1975, it did not explain the definition's
basis.l29 The House Report on the Endangered Species Act of 1973
may give some insight into the basis for the definition of "harass":
[Take] includes harassment, whether intentional or not. This
would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the
activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might
disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise
their young. 13O

The Fish and Wildlife Service's final definition of "harass" differs
from its proposed definition of "harass," which was:
[A]n act which either actually or potentially harms wildlife by
killing or injuring it, or by annoying it to such an extent as to cause
serious disruption in essential behavior patterns, such as feeding,
breeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning
of Iharass." 131

This proposed definition of "harass" was the basis for a final
definition of "harm," which the Fish and Wildlife Service defined as
follows on September 26, 1975:
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act or
omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts
which annoy it to such an extent as to Significantly disrupt essential
behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding,
feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning
of "harm" ....132

The definition of "harm" adopted in 1975 differed from the proposed definition of "harass" by including the words: "or omission II
128. so C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations define "wildlife" to mean
the same as "fish or wildlife." Id. at § 10.12. "Fish or wildlife" in tum is defined to mean "any
wild animal, whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild mammal, bird,
reptile, amphibian, fish, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod, coelenterate, or other invertebrate,
whether or not bred, hatched, or born in captivity, and including any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof." Id. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations at 50 C.F.R. § 10.11 (1993) provide
that words in singular form shall include plural, and words in plural form shall include
singular.
129. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-16 (Sept. 26, 1975) (codified at SO C.F.R. § 17.3).
130. H.R. REP. NO. 412, 93d Cong., IstSess. 11 (1973).
131. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 ijuly 8,1975).
132 SO C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975). This 1975 definition of "harm" was amended in 1981. See infra
notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
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after "act" and by substituting the words: "which actually injures or
kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or .sheltering" for the words:
"which either actually or potentially hanns wildlife by killing or
injuring it, or by annoying it to such an extent as to cause serious disruption in essential behavioral patterns, such as feeding, breeding or
sheltering. "133
In adopting these final definitions of "harass" and "harm" in 1975,
the Fish and Wildlife Service explained:
The definition of "harass" has been retained in a modified form
in this final rulemaking, to make it applicable to actions or omissions with the potential for injury. The concept of environmental
damage being considered a "taking" has been retained, but is now
found in a new definition, of the word "harm." "Harm" covers actions or omissions which actually (as opposed to potentially), cause
injury. In addition, the definition of "harass" has been modified by
restricting its application to acts or omissions which are done intentionally or negligently. In the proposal, "harass" would have applied to any action, regardless of intent or negligence ....
By moving the concept of environmental degradation to the
definition of "harm," potential restrictions on environmental modifications are expressly limited to those actions causing actual death
or injury to a protected species of fish of wildlife ....

****
It should be noted that this definition of "harm" which includes
significant environmental modification, does not permanently limit
the environmental modifications that are permissible for the habitat
of a listed species of fish or wildlife. . .. [T]he species could recover
completely and be delisted altogether. Finally, the species in question could abandon its use of the area. In all of these situations, the
limited restrictions on environmental modification under the definition of "harm" would be removed. 134

The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harass" consequently should be interpreted to exclude destruction or modification
of wildlife habitat because the Service's final definition of "harass"
was intended to exclude "significant environmental [habitat] modification or degradation."135 The Service intended that such habitat

133. Compare 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 Ouly 8, 1975) with 40 Fed. Reg. 44,416-17 (Sept. 26, 1975)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
134. Id. at 44,413.
135. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 Guly 8,1975).
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destruction or modification be included only in its definition of
IIharm.lIl36

B. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources
(PaliZa 1)

The Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm" was
interpreted in 1979 in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural
ResouTces137 (PaliZa 1). The district court in Palila I held that acts and

136. There have not been any judicial interpretations of the Service's definition of "harass"
in any specific factual situation. although Chief Judge Mikva of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed that the prohibition against "harassment"
"can limit a private landowner's use of his land in a rather broad manner." Sweet Home
Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 10 (D.c. Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C. J., concurring in section II(A)(l) of
the opinion), modified on reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
The Service's definition of "harass· is drafted in such a manner that "harass" includes an
intentional act or omission that creates the requisite likelihood of injury to wildlife, even if the
person had no intent to injure or kill wildlife, and even if the person had no knowledge, or
reason to know, that their act or omission created the requisite injury to wildlife. Chief Judge
Mikva has stated that "the prohibition against harassment can be used to suppress activities
that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt,
1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, C. J., concurring in section II(A)(l) of the opinion). The Service's definition
of "harass: however, does not define "intentional." "Intentional" act or omission might be interpreted the same as "voluntary act or omission" is defined in crirninallaw, meaning an act or
omission that 1s the product of free and conscious will or of a situation where the person had
the choice and opportunity to act differently. See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSllN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAw, § 3.2(c), at 197-200 (3d ed. 1986); Kilbride v. Lake, N.Z.L. Rev. 590 (1961), cited
in JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL LAw 128-33 (2d ed. 1988). Under such an interpretation. an act or omission would not be intentional if the act or omission occurred while the
person was asleep or unconscious. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at § 3.2(c). Such an interpretation of an "intentional act or omission" would essentially be the same as the definition of
what constitutes a "knowing" violation of the Endangered Species Act's takings prohibitions
for purposes of imposition of civil penalties and criminal punishment under the Act. See supra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Almost any act or omission engaged in by a person would
be "intentional" under this interpretation if the person was not asleep or unconscious when the
act or omission occurred; therefore there would be no need to determine if the act or omission
was "negligent."
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harass" does not define "negligent." In order
for a person's act or omission to be "negligent" within the meaning of "harass," the person
probably would have to have breached a duty to an endangered or threatened species of wildlife, proximately causing injury by creating "the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it
to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(1993). Under traditional tort principles, a person would have such a duty if the person's act or
omission created a foreseeable risk of such injury to wildlife. See FOWLER W. HARPER, FLEMING
JAMES, JR., & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.2, at 654-55 (2d ed. 1986). A person
would breach such a duty if he or she fails to exercise reasonable care, exposing protected
species of wildlife to an unreasonable risk of injury. See id. § 16.9, at 466-67. The degree of care
required in a particular situation traditionally is determined by consideration of the gravity of
the harm threatened by the person's conduct and the likelihood that the person's conduct will
cause that harm, weighed against the costs that would be incurred if the person acted to avoid
that risk. ld. at 467~.
137. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
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omissions of Hawaiian officials, in maintaining populations of feral
sheep and goats on state-owned land which was a critical habitat of
the endangered palila bird species, constituted a taking in violation
of section 9138 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, under the Fish
and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" in the Act's definition of
"take."139 The district court in Palila I granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment in a citizen suit under the Endangered
Species Act and ordered that all of the feral sheep and goats be
removed from the palila's critical habitat, on the grounds that the
palila required all of its critical habitat to survive.1 4O
The district court based this judgment upon its findings that the
feral sheep and goats within the palila's critical habitat ate seedlings
and shoots of the mamane trees and leaves of the naio trees,141 which
provided food, shelter and nest sites for the palila in its critical
habitat142 and prevented regeneration of the mamane-naio forest,
causing a "relentless decline II of the palila's designated critical
habitat.143 The district court concluded IIthat the feral sheep and
goats maintained by defendants ... [were] the major cause of that
habitat's degradation,"l44 and that the acts and omissions of the
defendants were "clearly within ll the Fish and Wildlife Service's
definition of IIharm ll as IIsignificant environmental modification or
degradation" which actually injures or kills wildlife.1 45
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment in Palila I, holding that lI[t]he defendants' actioit in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat ... [was] a violation of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by
the activityll146 and that lI[t]he district court's conclusion ... [was]
consistent with the Act's legislative history showing. that Congress
was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is the
destruction of their natural habitat. 1I147 Palila I is the only major
138. 16 U.S.c. § 1538 (1976).
139. The district court also held that enforcement of the Endangered Species Act's takings
prohibition against the state, state agencies and state employees does not violate either the
Tenth or Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 471 F. Supp. at 992-99.
140. Id. at 991.
141. Id. at 990.
142. Id. at 989.
143. Id. at 990.
144. Id. at 991.
145. Id. at 995.
146. 639 F.2d at 497.
147. Id. at 498 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978».
In 1986, Chief Judge Samuel King explained that in his 1979 decision in Palila 1 "[he] did
not find that habitat modification alone caused harm to Palila . . .. On the contrary, the evidence considered at the summary judgment hearing overwhelmingly showed that the feral
animals had a drastic negative impact on the mamane forest which in tum injured the Palila by
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judicial decision interpreting the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975
definition of "harm."l48 Subsequently, the Fish and Wildlife Service
modified its definition of "harm" in

v.

1981.

FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE'S 1981 REDEFINmON OF "HARM"

A. History of the Regulation

In 1981, the

Fish and Wildlife Service proposed a regulation that
would have redefined "harm" as "an act ••• which injures or kills
wildlife,"149 on the grounds that its original 1975 definition of "harm"
could be interpreted to include "significant environmental [habitat]
modification or degradation" as a prohibited taking "without further
proof of actual injury or death to a listed species."lSO The Fish and
Wildlife Service noted that under such an interpretation, a showing
of significant habitat modification or degradation alone would be
sufficient to invoke the criminal penalties of section 9, 16 U.S.c. §

significantly disrupting its essential behavioral habits." Palila v. Hawaii Oep't of Land &
Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 n.21 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1988) (Palila 11). Chief Judge King added in Palila 11 that:
Continued destruction of the forest would have driven the bird into extinction ...
[and) [a)t the time ..., the continued presence of feral sheep had a severe negative
impact on the Palila by indirectly suppressing the population figures to a level
which threatened extinction and by preventing the expansion or recovery of the
population. These {actors supported my decision to order removal of the feral
sheeps and goats in Palr1a 1.
649 F. Supp. at 1078. Chief Judge King added that in Palila I he did not interpret the Fish and
Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm" "to require an actual decline in population of an endangered species." Id. at 1076 n.21. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in 1988 in its
Palila II decision that "[i)n Palila I, the district court construed harm to include habitat destruction that could result in the extinction of the Palila." 852 F.2d at 1108.
148. In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the United States Supreme
Court, although primarily addressing the issue of whether operation of the Tellico Dam would
violate section 7, 16 U.S.c. § 1536, of the Endangered Species Act, by jeopardizing the continued existence of the endangered snail darter fish, indicated that the operation of the dam
might "harm" the snail darter within the meaning of the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975
definition of "harm" and violate section 9, 16 U.S.c. § 1538, of the Act. The Supreme Court
noted that the district court had found that the reservoir that would be created by the dam
would have a low oxygen content, while the snail darter needed a clear, flowing river with a
high oxygen content, that the low oxygen and high silt levels in the water in the reservoir
would not be suitable for snail darter spawning. and that the snail darter's primary source of
food would probably not survive in a reservoir environment. 437 U.s. at 165-66 n.16 (citing
419 F. Supp. at 756). Emphasizing that the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm"
included "significant environmental modification or degradation" which "actually kills or
injures wildlife" by "significantly disrupting essential behavioral patterns," the Supreme Court
stated: "[w)e do not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico without 'harming' the
snail darter." 437 U.s. at 184-85 n.3O. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources,
649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077-78 n.22 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
149. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (1981) (proposed June 2, 1981).
150. Id.
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1538, of the Endangered Species Act, "regardless of whether an
actual killing or injuring of a listed species of wildlife is demonstrated."151
The Fish and Wildlife Service did not adopt this proposed redefinition of "harm," instead adopting on November 4, 1981, a regulation that redefined "harm" (in the Act's definition of "take") to mean
"an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering,"152 The Fish and
Wildlife Service stated that "harm" was being redefined:
to mean any action, including habitat modification, which actually
kills or injures wildlife, rather than the present interpretation which
might be read to include habitat modification or degradation alone
without further proof of death or injury. Habitat modification as
injury would only be covered by the new definition if it significantly impaired essential behavioral patterns of a listed species.153
The Service added that its revised definition of "harm" was not
limited to:
direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife
species, ... The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude claims
of a section 9 taking for habitat modification alone without any
attendant death or injury of the protected wildlife. Death or injury,
however, may be caused by impairment of essential behavioral
patterns which can have significant and permanent effects on a
listed species. l54
The Fish and Wildlife Service also stated, in the preamble to its regulation redefining "harm," that Palila [155 can "be read to incorrectly
imply that under the Services [sic] definition of 'harm' a taking may
occur from habitat modification alone."I56 The Fish and Wildlife
. Service stressed that under its redefinition of "harm":
[H]abitat modification or degradation, standing alone, is not a
taking pursuant to section 9. To be subject to section 9, the

151. Id.
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981) (emphasis added) (codified

152.
153.

at 50 c.F.R. § 17.3).
Responding to this statement by the Fish and Wildlife Service, Chief Judge Samuel King, the
author of the district court opinion in Palila I, asserted in 1986 of his 1979 decision in Palila I "I
did not find that habitat modification alone caused harm to the Palila." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't
of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 n.21 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 147.
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modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly
impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury
to a protected wildlife species. The word "impair" was substituted
for "disrupt" to limit harm to situations where a behavioral pattern
was adversely affected and not simply disturbed on a temporary
basis with no consequent injury to the protected species.1 57

Habitat modification does not constitute "harm" under this new
1981 definition unless the habitat modification causes death or injury
to members of a protected species.l58 Under this new definition of
"harm," however, modification of the habitat of a listed wildlife species constitutes "harm" when the habitat modification "causes ascertainable physical injury or death to an individual member of a listed
species."159 The new definition of "harm" does not "require an actual
decline in population of an endangered species"16O and "does not
indicate that threatened extinction is necessary for a finding of
harm. "161 Scientific evidence demonstrating that habitat modification is impairing a species' essential behavioral patterns, however, is
not a sufficient basis to infer, for purposes of this new definition of
"harm," that death or injury is necessarily occurring. 162

B. Questions Raised by the Regulation and Suggested Interpretations
The Service's definition of "harm" does not define when habitat
modification or degradation is "Significant." Habitat modification or
degradation that "actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering,"l63 should be "significant." The determination of whether
habitat modification constitutes "harm" under the new definition,
however, generally "requires an evaluation of the species involved,

157.

46 Fed.

Reg. 54,750 (1981) (emphasis added) (codified at 50 U.S.c. § 17.3).

158. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1077, affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F.
Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala. 1992). See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993)
(stating that a showing of actual injury to a listed species is required in order for there to be
"harm" and a "taking" in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act; a "one in a
million risk of harm is [not] sufficient"); see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States
Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1990).
159. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,5 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds,
17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
160. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1076 n.21.

161. Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp.
162. Cd. at 939.
163. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (codified at.50 C.F.R. § 17.3).

923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992).
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the biological needs of that species, and the degree of habitat modification. "164
One question not answered by either the Endangered Species
Act's definition of "take" or the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition
of "harm" is whether an action of federal, state or local government,
permitting or authorizing another person to engage in conduct that
kills or injures endangered or threatened wildlife, is a prohibited taking in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The Fish and Wildlife Service, at least in California, has taken the position in letters to
municipal and county officials that such officials can violate ~he Act's
takings prohibition if they approve, through zoning actions, proposed development of land that serves as habitat for a listed protected species.165
When such governmental authorization is a legal prerequisite to
private action that modifies the habitat of endangered or threatened
species and causes the death or injury of members of that species,
that governmental authorization is a cause-in-fact of such death or
injury166 and should be found, along with such private action, to
have "harmed" and "taken" protected species in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Thus, the Fish and Wildlife Service's redefinition of "harm" should be interpreted to mean that "harm" includes
federal, state or local government action that authorizes or permits a
person to engage in conduct that kills or injures protected species of
wildlife, when such governmental authorization or permission is a
legal prerequisite for that other person's action.1 67

164. Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992), aJfd sub nom.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115
S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6,1995) (No. 94-859).
165. See Thornton, Takings, supra note 56, at 50-51.
The Fish and Wildlife Service also reportedly has advised county officials in California that
the County could be responsible for a "take" in violation of the Act if it recommended that
private landowners clear flammable brush in the endangered Stephens' Kangaroo rat habitat
in order to create a preemptive firebreak. See Rep. Al McCandless, Letter to the Editor - Homes
Burned So Rats Nests Could Survive, WASH. PosT, Sept. 6, 1994, at A16.
166. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (including "but for" and substantial
factor causation).
167. One court, without explicitly discussing the issue of whether a governmental body
"takes" wildlife when it authorizes or permits action by another person that kills or injures
wildlife, held that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) registration of pesticides containing strychnine, causing the death of endangered species that ate strychnine-laced rodent
bait (or rodents that had been poisoned by such bait), constituted a prohibited taking of an
endangered species in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA,
882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit reasoned in this case that: (1) "a taking
occurs when the challenged activity has 'some prohibited impact on an endangered species',"
id. at 1300-m (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497
(9th Cir. 1981»; and (2) that the EPA's strychnine registrations had a prohibited impact on
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A more troublesome issue under the takings prohibitions of the
Endangered Species Act is whether a granting of funds by federal,
state or local government to a person, who utilizes such funds to
undertake an action, constitutes a prohibited taking when that person's action kills or injures a protected species of wildlife. Government funds granted to a person should be held to "harm" and "take"
a protected species if there is a finding that the person's action that
killed or injured wildlife would not have occurred "but for" the
granting of government funds, or that the government's grant was a
substantial factor in the person's action that killed or injured a protected species. l68 The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm"
should also be interpreted to mean that a governmental granting of
funds constitutes "harm" in such a situation.
Another issue not explicitly addressed by either the Endangered
Species Act's definition of "take" or the Fish and Wildlife Service's
definition of "harm," is whether an omission, such as the failure of a
governmental official or agency to perform a mandatory duty, or
exercise discretionary powers, to prevent another person from killing
or injuring an endangered or threatened species of wildlife, can constitute a prohibited taking. The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition
of "harass"169 applies to either an "act" or "omission," as did the Fish
and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm";170 but the Service's
1981 redefinition of "harm" only refers to an "act which actually kills
or injures wildlife."l71

endangered species because endangered species had died after eating strychnine bait and because "strychnine can be distributed only if it is registered. Consequently, the EPA's decision
to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these registrations was critical to the
resulting poisoning of endangered species." 882 F.2d at 1301. Because the Eighth Circuit
found that "[tJhe relationship between the registration decision and the deaths of endangered
species ... [was) dear," the EPA's registration of strychnine was held to constitute the taking of
endangered species. ld. The court's reasoning suggests that it was applying a "but for" causation test-that "but for" EPA's registration of strychnine, endangered species would not eat
strychnine bait and be killed.
Another court, without supporting reasoning, held that the federal government's authorization of the use of lead shot by hunters, when such lead shot causes the death of wild bald
eagles through lead poisoning when eagles consume other birds that have consumed lead shot
or been wounded or killed by lead shot, constituted a taking in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal.
1985). See also Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in
part sub nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that Forest Service's
management practices and policies, allowing private timber companies to cut timber in national forests within endangered species habitats, "harm" the species by causing a severe
decline in the species population). See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
169. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
170. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,415 to 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975»
(current version at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993».
171. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
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The 1981 redefinition of "harm" might be interpreted as only applying to affirmative acts that kill or injure wildlife. However, when
it adopted its redefinition of "harm" in 1981, the Service stated that it
deleted the phrase "or omission" from its definition of "harm" since
the term "'act' ..• [was] inclusive of either commissions or omissions
which would be prohibited by section 9."172 The Fish and Wildlife
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" therefore should be interpreted
to mean that "harm" occurs when a governmental agency or official
fails to perform a mandatory duty, prescribed by statute, regulation,
court order, etc., or fails to exercise discretionary powers conferred
by statute or regulation, to prevent another person from killing or
injuring an endangered or threatened species of wildlife.
In the case of federal departments and agencies such an interpretation of "harm" is consistent with "the policy of Congress [under the
Endangered Species Act] that all Federal departments and agencies .
. . shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the
Act]."l73 This interpretation of "harm" also would be consistent with
tort standards of causation-in-fact because it would apply the definition of "harm" to omissions by federal, state and local government
agencies and officials that are "but for" causes of, or a substantial factor in, the death or injury of protected species of wildlife. 174

172. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981) (codified at.50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
In 1994, however, the United States contended, in a petition for rehearing of Sweet Home
Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text,
that the Service's 1981 redefinition of harm required that "habitat modification involve
'affirmative action which creates death or disturbance to essential behavioral patterns with
significant and permanent, injurious effects.'" Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192
(D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.) (quoting Petition for Rehearing), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Stephen Wi11iams, in his statement joined in by Judge
Sentelle, explaining his vote in favor of the court's per curiam denial of the appellee's petition
for rehearing, asserted that the regulation "in fact requires no 'affirmative action.'" rd. After
quoting the Service's 1981 statement, Judge Williams accused the federal government of
misrepresenting the regulation. rd. Judge Williams argued that "the Department [of Interior)
inserted the word 'actually' before 'kills or injures' in its redefinition of harm merely to underscore the need for a causal link-a showing that the 'significant and permanent effects' on the
species have been 'due to a party's actions.'" rd. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 to 54,749 (Nov. 4,
1981».
173. 16 U.S.c. § 1531(c)(1) (1988).
174. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
Without explicitly addressing the issue of whether "harm" can occur through an omission.
one court held that the failure or refusal of the Secretary of the Interior and the Fish and
Wildlife Service to perform its non-discretionary duty under section 4(f), 16 U.S.c. § 1533(f)
(1988), to develop and implement a recovery plan for an endangered species of fish, constituted a taking of the endangered species in violation of section 9 of the Act because members
of the endangered species were being killed, damaged, or destroyed. Sierra Oub v. Lujan. 36
Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533 (W.O. Tex. 1993).
Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1991), supports an interpretation of
"harm" as including a failure of a government agency to comply with requirements the agency
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Also troublesome is whether a private, non-governmental person
can "harm" and "take" a protected species of wildlife through an
omission or failure to protect a listed endangered or threatened
species of wildlife from death or injury. A non-governmental person
should only be liable under the Endangered Species Act, through an
omission, when the person has killed or injured an endangered or
threatened species by breaching a legal duty, imposed by statute,
regulation, judicial order, or common law, to protect the wildlife
from such harm. 175 If a private person's liability for a "taking" under
the Act through an omission is not limited to when he or she
breaches a legal duty to a protected species, a private landowner
might have to "spend money to affirmatively manipulate their lands
to improve habitat conditions for listed species"176 anytime listed
wildlife was threatened with death or physical injury from hunters,
animal predators, disease, other action by third parties, or other
natural causes.
Yet another issue not addressed by the Fish and Wildlife
Service's redefinition of "harm" is the type of evidentiary showing
required to show that habitat modification has killed or injured endangered or threatened species. When modification of wildlife
habitat involves the cutting down of a tree inhabited by wildlife and
the tree falls upon an animal and kills it, or otherwise directly kills a
protected wildlife species, the person who cut the tree down has
violated section-9's taking provision. Similarly, a person would kill
wildlife (and commit a prohibited taking through habitat modification) if he or she struck and killed an endangered or threatened wildlife species, while operating earthmoving equipment (such as a bulldozer or grader) to clear and develop land.
In each of these two examples, a person's modification of wildlife
habitat constitutes a prohibited "take" in violation of section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act because the person's actions would directly

has adopted to protect an endangered species. See infra note 200-01 and accompanying text.
See also Quarles et aI., supra note 29, at 12.
175. Such an approach to a private person's liability for "harm:' through an omission,
would be similar to the criminal law principles governing a person's liability for criminal
homicide (murder or manslaughter) for an omission. In order to be guilty of either murder or
manslaughter, a person must unlawfully kill another human being. See LAPA VE & ScaTI, supra
note 136, § 7.1 at 605 & § 7.9 at 652. American courts hold that a person can "kill" another
human being through an omission and be guilty of murder or manslaughter as a result of the
omission, only if the person had a legal duty (which is recognized only in limited circumstances under the criminal law) to the alleged victim of the criminal homicide and if the person's failure to perform that duty proximately caused the victim's death. See id. § 3.3 at 202-12.
A similar approach to criminal liability under the Endangered Species Act for "killing" an
endangered or threatened species through an omission is appropriate in view of the Act's purpose of insuring the survival and recovery of protected species.
176. See Quarles et aI., supra note 29, at 12.
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kill a protected wildlife species. There would be no need to determine if the habitat modification constituted IIharm ll under the Fish
and Wildlife Service's regulation. However, when there is no evidence that habitat modification has directly killed an endangered or
threatened species of wildlife, questions arise as to when habitat
modification constitutes IIharmll under the Fish and Wildlife Service's
regulation.
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of IIharmll does not state
whether a showing that a particular animal was killed must exist for
a court to find a II harm, II II kill, II or IItake ll of a protected wildlife
species, nor does it stat~ whether a showing that a person's actions or
habitat modification, causing a decrease in the population of a
protected species of wildlife, is sufficient to support a finding of a
Ilharm,1I IItake,1I or Ilkill.1I Several courts, however, have held that a
showing of IIharmll does not require proof of the death of individual
members of an endangered or threatened species of wildlife. l77
If the death of an individual wild animal is relied upon to show
IIharmll or a II kill II in violation of the Endangered Species Act, a number of issues may arise regarding when modification of a species'
habitat is alleged to have actually killed those specific animals.
When the body of a dead animal is found on modified or altered
land that is part of the animal's habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of IIharmll does not state what type of evidence or
showing is required in order for a court to find that the habitat modification actually killed that specific animal. The Service's definition
of IIharmll does not state whether, or when, modification or alteration
of a species' habitat can be found to be a IIharm" to, or a "kill" of, a
dead animal, if the direct cause of the animal's death appears to be
shooting by a hunter, the act of an animal predator, disease, malnutrition, starvation, or unknown (natural) causes.
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of IIharm" should be
interpreted to mean that the modification or degradation of wildlife
habitat will be found to have actually killed an individual member of
the species, if there is a finding that "but for" the habitat modification
or degradation the specific dead animal would not have been killed,
or that the habitat modification was a substantial factor in the killing
of the animal. Such an approach would follow the IIbut for" and substantial factor tests used by courts in civil torts cases to determine
whether a defendant's tortious conduct was the cause-in-fact of the

177. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (0. Haw.
1986), afJ'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1270 (E.D. Tex.
1988), afJ'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d
429 (5th Cir. 1991).
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plaintiff's injury,178 and would further Congress' intent to give "take"
a broad, protective definition179 and to protect and conserve the
habitat of endangered and threatened species of wildlife. ISO Under
such an interpretation, habitat modification could be considered to
have actually killed an animal that was shot by a hunter or killed by
an animal predator if there is a finding that the animal would not
have died when it did but for the habitat modification, or that the
habitat modification was a substantial factor in causing the animal's
death. Such a finding might be made when the habitat modification
destroyed an animal's food supply, shelter or protective vegetative
cover, causing the animal to migrate to a new habitat where it was
vulnerable to the hunter or animal predator that killed it.
Similarly, if a specific animal died as a result of starvation or
malnutrition, habitat modification that destroyed or reduced the
animal's food supply should be found to have actually killed the
animal if there is a finding that the animal would not have died but
for the damage to its food supply, or that the damage to its food
supply was a substantial factor in causing the animal's death. If a
specific protected animal was found dead on land that was not part
of modified or degraded wildlife habitat, there would be a finding
that the modification of the wildlife habitat was a "taking" if the dead
animal had used the altered or modified habitat prior to its death181
and if, using the "but for" or substantial factor test, the habitat modification was the cause-in-fact of the animal's death by forcing the
animal to migrate to new habitat where it died or was killed.

178. See Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L 1 (1993). In civil torts cases, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant's tortious conduct was both the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury and the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. See id. at 1-2. Traditionally, proof of causation-in-fact requires
the plaintiff to show that his or her injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
conduct. Id. at 4. However, many courts today hold that a defendant's conduct can be held to
be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury if the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor"
in causing the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 5-6. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District,
788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133-34 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
179. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
ISO. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
181. Proving that a particular dead animal had used the modified habitat may be difficult
when the animal is found dead on land outside the modified habitat, unless the dead animal
had peculiar identifying characteristics and had been observed within the modified habitat
prior to its death. Because such evidence usually will not be present, a court in such a case
might presume that the dead animal spent at least part of its life on the modified habitat if: (1)
the modified habitat, prior to its modification. had characteristics that made it suitable habitat
for the dead animal's species; and (2) the place where the dead animal's body was found was
close enough to the modified habitat to be within the range of members of the species. See
Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Summer 1993, at 6 (discussing the range and migratory habits of certain species protected
under the Endangered Species Act).
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Alternatively, it could be found that the habitat modification was the
cause-in-fact of the animal's death even if the animal had never been
on the altered or degraded habitat. t82
Some courts hold that modification of wildlife habitat can constitute "harm" when it causes a decrease in the population of the protected species. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, the court held that the management practices of the National Forest Service in eastern Texas'
national forests significantly modified the old growth pine tree
habitat of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.183 The court
held that the resulting decline in the species' population within the
national forests' modified habitat was "harm" within the meaning of
the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition. l84 The district court
in Lyng found that the case involved "not merely a situation where
the recovery of the species . . . [was] impaired by the agency's
practices, ... but rather the agency's practices themselves ... caused
and accelerated the decline in the species. "185
Specifically, the Lyng court determined the Forest Service's management practices implicated all four factors of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's definition of "harm."l86 First, the district court found that
"essential behavioral patterns of the woodpeckers ... [were] impaired by isolation of woodpecker colonies from one another,"
because the Forest Service's management practices altered "the customary habits of the birds to survive and produce young" by making
"woodpecker colonies particularly susceptible to outbreaks of
southern pine beetles" and by contributing "to woodpecker abandonment of cavity trees" used by the woodpeckers for their nests.187
Second, the district court found that the "isolation of particular
colonies interfere [d] with breeding practices," contributing to population decline because "males ... [could not] find females [with

182 This latter type of situation might occur if habitat modification caused hunters or
animal predators to move their hunting from the modified habitat to another area used by the
specific dead animal for its habitat, resulting in the animal being killed by the relocated
predator or hunter.
183. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub
nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
184. 694 F. Supp. at 1271-72. The Forest Service's "even-aged management" practices at
issue in Lyng involved c1ear<utting, shelterwood cutting, and seed-tree cutting. See id. at 1263
n.2.
The district court in Lyng also held that the defendants' actions violated section 7(a)(2) of
the Endangered Species Act. 694 F. Supp. at 1272-73 (interpreting U.s.c. § 1536(a)(2»; see supra
notes 114-27 and accompanying text. However, the defendants' actions did not violate the
Wilderness Act. 694 F. Supp. at 1273-75 (interpreting 16 U.S.c. §§ 1131-36).
185. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).
186. Id. (listing essential behavioral patterns, breeding, feeding and sheltering, as the four
factors constituting "harm").
187. Id.
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whom] to breed."I88 Third, the district court found that the Forest
Service's management practices reduced the woodpecker's food
supply and foraging areas. Fourth, the court found that the management practices reduced the number of cavity trees used as nests.1 89
The district court concluded in Lyng that the practices and policies of the Forest Service, "when taken as a whole, detrimentally impact[ed] upon the woodpecker and ... [were] largely responsible for
the rapid decline of the remaining birds in Texas."19O In short, the
court held that the Forest Service's management practices caused
"harm" to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker because the
practices significantly modified or degraded the woodpecker's
habitat, by significantly impairing essential behavioral patternsincluding breeding, feeding and sheltering - and actually killed
endangered woodpeckers, causing a decline in the woodpecker's
population within the national forests.1 91
However, the district court in Lyng did not explain how it found
that woodpecker deaths, or the significant modification of the woodpeckers' habitat resulting from the Forest Service's management
practices, caused the decline in the woodpecker population. The
finding that the population decline was due to deaths of woodpeckers apparently was based upon the fact that "[t]he last remaining
populations of these birds ... [were] concentrated in the national
forests, primarily because the old growth pines on private lands ...
[had] largely been eliminated."192 The district court in Lyng implicitly found that the woodpeckers had not migrated to private lands
when their habitat in the eastern Texas national forests was significantly modified. In the absence of evidence that woodpeckers had
migrated to other habitat, the decline in woodpecker population
could only be due, as found by the district court, to "large percentages of the few remaining birds hav[ing] died."I93 Since there was no
allegation or showing that the deaths and population decline of the
species were caused by something independent of the modification
of the species' habitat, the district court apparently found that the
deaths and declining population of red-cockaded woodpeckers

188. Id. at 1271-72. The court added that "[iJsolation also causes the gene pool to be reduced with fewer birds in a given area, causing genetic problems and abnonnalities in the
subsequent generations." Id. at 1272.
189. ld.
190. Id.
191. The district court in Lyng found that the "severe decline in the population of woodpeckers ... in the past ten years: id. at 1270, was due to "large percentages of the few remaining birds" dying. id. at 1271.
192. Id. at1265.
193. Id. at 1271.
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within national forests were caused by the significant habitat'modification resulting from the Forest Service's management practices.194
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly recognized the possibility that the deaths and decline of the red-cockaded
woodpecker might have been caused by some other act independent
of the Forest Service's management practices, by stating that lithe
[red-cockaded woodpecker] population hard] not fallen as a result of
permits granted under section 1539(a)(1).11195
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court in Lyng IIdid
not err in finding that the government violated ESA section 9,"196 but
vacated the district court's orders so far as they mandated the
specific features of a Forest Service timber management plan for
national forests in Texas.l97 The Fifth Circuit noted that the district
court in Lyng determined that the Forest Service's management practices IIresulted in significant habitat modificationll and IIcaused and
accelerated the decline in the [red-cockaded woodpecker] species. 1I198
In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Forest Service had not
completely implemented its wildlife management handbook, which
specified silvicultural practices that should be followed in order to
protect red-cockaded woodpeckers, by permitting clearcutting within 200 feet of woodpecker cavity trees and by not removing midstory
hardwood. This lack of implementation led to the woodpeckers'
abandonment of cavity trees.t 99 The Fifth Circuit stated that the
Forest Service's:
course of conduct certainly impair[ed] the [red-cockaded woodpecker'S] lIessential behavioral patterns, including ... sheltering, II 50
c.P.R. § 17.3, and thus result[ed1 in a violation of section 9....
Because the dictates of the USPS's handbook were intended to
preserve the dwindling [red-cockaded woodpecker1 population, it
... [was] not unreasonable to conclude that failure to observe the
handbook would result in a lltakingll of the [red-cockaded woodpecker].200

194. rd. at 1263.
195. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991).
196. rd. at 439.
197. rd. at 440. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not erred in determining
that the defendants' actions violated section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.c. § 1536),
926 F.2d at 439, but held that the district court "exceeded its authority to enjoin violations of
the [Endangered Species Act)" because "[t)he court's injunction eviscerated the [section 7)
consultation process by effectively dictating the result of that process." Id. at 440.
198. rd. at 438 (quoting 694 F. Supp. at 1260).

199. rd.
200. rd.

at 438-39 (footnote omitted).
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The Fifth Circuit then concluded "that the district court did not err in
finding that the government violated ESA section 9."201 Therefore,
Sierra Club v. Lyng, as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
stands for the proposition that "harm" to an endangered or protected
species occurs when that species' population declines after there is
significant modification of that species' habitat which significantly
impairs the species' breeding, feeding or sheltering, in the absence of
a showing that the decline in the species' population is due either to
the death of members of the species by independent causes or to migration of members of the species to new habitat, without resulting
injury to the migrating animals.
Since the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" requires
actually killing or injuring wildlife, there must be a finding either: (1)
that the decline in population was due to the death of species caused
by the habitat modification, or (2) that the decline in population was
due to members of the species migrating to new habitat because of
the modification of their habitat and that the habitat modification
caused "injury" (either to the migrating members of the species or to
members of the species that remain within the modified habitat, or
bOth).202 Proof of the death of individual members of a protected
species, by producing evidence of dead bodies of animals, should
not be required in order to prove a "kill" or "harm" of a protected
species. Furthermore, an affirmative showing that members of the
species have died, or migrated to new habitat with resultant "injury"
to the species, is not required, in order to find harm within the meaning of Fish and Wildlife Service regulations.
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" should be
interpreted to mean that "harm" includes significant modification or
degradation of a protected species' habitat, which significantly impairs essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering, when there is a decline in the population of the species
within a particular habitat after, or during, modification or degradation of part or all of that habitat. 203 The burden should be on the

201. Id. at 439 (citation and footnote omitted). The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit implies
that the term "act" in the Fish and Wildlife Service's redefinition of "harm" can be interpreted to
include an omission or failure to act, at least when a federal government agency fails to comply with policies it adopted to protect an endangered or listed species. See supra notes 169-74
and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of "injury"
within the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm").
203. In order to invoke this presumption, a court would first have to geographically define
the habitat of a species. The species' habitat for purposes of this presumption may be a greater
area than the area that has been modified or altered, as determined by the characteristics that
make an area suitable habitat for a particular species and by the range and migratory habits of
that species. See Taylor, supra note 181. A court also would have to determine the species'
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person who allegedly engaged in or caused the habitat modification
or degradation, to show that either: (1) the decline in the species'
population was due to death of members of the species caused by
something independent of the habitat modification or degradation,204 or (2) the decline in the species' population was due to the
migration of members of the species to a new habitat and that such
migration did not cause "injury" to members of the species. Under
this approach, a court will presume that the population decrease was
caused by the significant habitat modification, if evidence exists that
the population, within a particular protected species' habitat, has
decreased after or during significant habitat modification.
This
presumption is consistent with the policy of the Endangered Species
Act to protect the habitat of endangered and threatened species of
wildlife, and it is rational because wildlife usually is killed or injured
when modification of their habitat significantly impairs their breeding, feeding or shelter.2os The presumption that the death of animals

population both before and after the habitat modification, in order to determine if the species'
population had declined after or during the habitat modification. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694
F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter,
926 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
204. Even if the death of a specific animal was directly caused by a hunter shooting a
predatory animal, or by starvation, malnutrition, or disease, modification of that animal's habitat may still be the cause-in-fact of that animal's death and considered a "harm" to that animal
if it is found that the animal would not have died or been killed at that time "but for" the
modification of its habitat, or that the habitat modification was a substantial factor in causing
the animal's death. See supra notes 177-$2 and accompanying text.
20S. See Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1991), affd in part and vacated in
part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
Such a presumption is also arguably rational because the population of endangered and
threatened species should increase as a result of recovery plans developed and implemented
by the Secretary of the Interior under section 4(f), 16 U.S.c. § 1S33(f), of the Act. The goal of
such recovery plans is "the conservation and survival of the species" so "that the species (can]
be removed from the list" of endangered or threatened species. ld. at § 1S33(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
Under the Endangered Species Act, however, "(o]nly two domestic species have been delisted
due to recovery from endangerment," and only "a minority of listed species boasts recovery
plans, and few of the 34S approved recovery plans have been implemented." Desiderio, supra
note 28, at 41, SO.
(O]f the hundreds of species listed as endangered or threatened by [the Fish and
Wildlife Service] since 1973, most remain poised today on the brink of extinction.
Less than a handful of species have recovered in numbers sufficient to warrant a
change in their condition. Importantly, more species have become extinct than
those that have been recovered.
ld. at 41. In light of these facts, a broad interpretation of "harm," to include an unexplained decline in a species' population when its habitat has been significantly modified, would further
the purposes of the Endangered Species Act to protect endangered and threatened species of
wildlife and their habitat.
The birth of new members of a species, of course, may affect the extent to which the population of a particular species in a specific area will decline when modification of the species'
habitat causes the death of members of that species. In some cases, population of a species in a
particular area may not decline during a particular period of time even though modification of
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and a decline in wildlife species population results from significant
modification of that species' habitat could be overcome by evidence
that the decline in population is due to the death of members of the
species caused by some other act independent of the habitat modification, or by non-injurious migration of members of the species to a
new habitat. 206
The Fish and Wildlife Service's redefinition of "harm" does not
define what types of harm "injure" wildlife. The Service's definition
of "harm" indicates, however, that "harm" includes, but is not limited
to, "significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering" by significant habitat modification or
degradation. 207 The Service's definition of "harm," however, does
not require proof of physical injury (serious or otherwise) to an individual animal in order for an act to "injure" wildlife.
The Service's definition of "harm" should be interpreted to mean
that "harm" occurs either if an act or omission causes physical injury,

the species' habitat causes the death of some members of that species, when the number of
new members of the species that are born during a particular period of time equals or exceeds
the number of members of the species that die during that period. In the absence of evidence
that modification of a species' habitat has caused a decline in the species' population, some
other evidence that modification of a species' habitat has killed or injured members of the species would be reqUired to establish that the habitat modification was a taking prohibited by
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act.
206. Such a rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden of proof to the person
accused of a "taking" to show that the decline of a species' population was not caused by that
person's modification of the species' habitat, is arguably similar to the approach followed by
Judge Jenkins in Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). Allen involved an action
brought against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1291, 1346,
2671-80 (1988), by approximately 1200 individuals, alleging that nearly 500 deaths and cancer
were caused by radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonation of atomic bombs in Nevada in
the 1950's and early 1960's. Since Judge Jenkins found that the cancers suffered by the plaintiffs could be caused by natural, unknown, or "spontaneous" causes as well as by radiation and
that science could not distinguish between cancers caused by radiation and cancers caused by
other sources, he adopted the following test for determining if the federal government's atomic
bomb tests were the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs cancer:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an
identifiable population group at increased risk, a member of that group at risk
develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused by
the hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having
been demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive, and connecting factors, a fact finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition
absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant.
588 F. Supp. at 415. Similarly, when the population of a species within its habitat has declined
after its habitat has been modified, it is possible that the population decline is the result of
deaths of animals from some other act independent of the habitat modification or migration of
animals to new habitat, rather than the habitat modification. As in Allen, considerations of
fairness support a shifting of the burden of proof to the person who modified a species' habitat
to prove that the modification of habitat did not kill or injure members of the species.
207. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
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whether serious or otherwise, to an individual animal, or significantly impairs essential behavioral patterns of a wildlife species,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering, through significant habitat
modification or otherwise. Such an interpretation would include
within II injury II both direct physical injury to specific, individual
animals, and "injury" to a large number of animals and even an entire
species resulting from adverse impacts on feeding, breeding,
sheltering, or other essential behavioral patterns of one or more
members of a species of wildlife. Such an interpretation of "harm"
recognizes the importance of a species I habitat in providing food,
shelter, protection, breeding and reproduction sites, and nesting sites
for the rearing of young,208 and recognizes the Endangered Species
Act's policy of protecting the habitat of listed species. 209 Such an
interpretation is consistent with the 1986 district court decision in
Palila v. Hawaii Department o/Land & Natural Resources (Palila 11).210
C. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources
(Palila II)

In Palila II, the district court held that the conduct of state officials, in permitting mouflon sheep in the endangered palila bird'
species I designated critical habitat, constituted a prohibited "take"
under the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of Iharm."211
The district court in Palila II found that this conduct constituted
"harm" within the meaning of the Service's definition of "harm"
because:
(1) the eating habits of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland
and thus caused habitat degradation that could result in extinction;
[and] (2) were the mouflon to continue eating the mamane [trees],
the woodland would not regenerate and the Palila population
would not recover to a point where [the Palila] could be removed
from the Endangered Species list."212

The district court reasoned in Palila II that "harm" under the Service's
1981 redefinition, "would include activities that significantly impair
essential behavioral patterns to the extent that there is an actual
negative impact or injury to the endangered species, threatening its
continued existence or recovery, II and "[u]nder both the original

208. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
210. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), af!d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th eir. 1988).

211. 649 F. Supp. at 1080.
212. 852 F.2d at 1107.
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definition and the definition as amended in 1981, 'harm' may include
significant habitat destruction that injures protected wildlife." 213
The district court also stated in Palila II that:
[a] finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members
of the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation
is presently driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and
effects a taking under section 9 of the Act. 214
Although the court stated that Congress intended under the Endangered Species Act lito prohibit habitat destruction that harms an
endangered species,1I 215 the court added that:
since the purpose of the Endangered Species Act is to protect endangered wildlife, there can be no finding of a taking unless habitat
modification or degradation has an adverse impact on the protected
species.... [H]owever, this injury to the species does not necessitate
a finding of death to individual species members ... [and] a showing of "harm" similarly does not require a decline in population
numbers... , Until [a listed species] has reached a sufficiently
viable population to be delisted, it should not be necessary for it to
dip closer to extinction before the prohibitions of section 9 come
into force. The key to the Secretary's definition is harm to the species as a whole through habitat destruction or modification. If the
habitat modification prevents the population from recovering, then
this causes injury to the species and should be actionable under
section 9.216
Finding that the II mouflon sheep are having the same destructive
impact on the mamane as the feral sheep [in Palila I 217]"218 and that
lithe Palila population may be as large as it can be now, given the
condition of the mamanell219 in the Palila's designated critical habitat,
the district court, per Judge King, found that:

213. 649 F. Supp. at 1075.

214. Id.
215. Id. at 1076.
216. Id. at 1077 (footnote omitted). An example of no adverse impact on a species resulting from a habitat modification or degradation is "if the State were to mow the lawn within the
Palila's critical habitat, this modification would not in and of itself result in a taking under
section 9. There would have to be a showing of concomitant injury to Palila, such as a significant impairment of Palila breeding or feeding habits." Id. at 1077 n.24.
217. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979),
affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
218. 649 F. Supp. at 1079.
219. Id. at 1079-80.
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Continued grazing by mouflon will continue to suppress mamane
growth and regeneration. This in tum will harm the Palila in one of
two ways. Either the mouflon sheep will further degrade the mamane ecosystem, thus decreasing the remaining Palila habitat and
further depressing the Palila population. Or, at best, the mouflon
will merely slow or prevent the recovery of the mamane forest,
suppressing the available food supply and nesting sites for Palila,
and thus preventing the Palila population from expanding toward
recovery.220

This finding led Judge King to conclude in Palila II that:
[T)he mouflon sheep are harming the Palila within the definition of
50 c.P.R. § 17.3. The mouflon are having a significant negative im-

pact on the mamane forest, on which the Palila is wholly dependent
for breeding, feeding and sheltering. This significant habitat degradation is actually presently injuring the Palila by decreasing food
and nesting sites, so that the Palila population is suppressed to its
current critically endangered levels. If the mouflon continue eating
the mamane, the forest will not regenerate and the Palila population will not recover to a point where it can be removed from the
Endangered Species List. Thus, the presence of mouflon sheep on
Mauna Kea threatens the continued existence and the recovery of
the Palila species. If the Palila is to have any hope of survival, the
mouflon must be removed to give the mamane forest a chance to
recover and expand.221

Judge King rejected the state's argument that multiple use of the
palila's critical habitat on Mauna Kea by mouflon sheep and the
palila should be allowed, on the grounds that once the plaintiffs have
shown the "significant negative impact" of mouflon sheep "'harming'
the Palila population within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, ... the
[Endangered Species] Act leaves no room for mixed use or other
management strategies or policies. "222
Judge King concluded in Palila II that:
[T)he presence of the mouflon sheep in numbers sufficient for sporthunting purposes is harming the Palila. They degrade the mamane
ecosystem to the extent that there is an actual present negative
impact on the Palila population that threatens the continued existence and recovery of the species. Once this determination has been
made, the Endangered Species Act leaves no room for balancing
policy considerations, but rather requires me to order the removal
of the mouflon sheep from Mauna Kea. . .. [T]he mouflon sheep

220. Id.
221. Id. 1080 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
222. Id. at 1081.
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are to be removed from the critical habitat of the Palila on Mauna
Kea.223

Unlike the court in Sierra Club v. Lyng,224 which held that there
was "harm" to an endangered species when the habitat modification
caused the population of the species within the habitat to decline,
Judge King in Palila II held that significant habitat modification of an
endangered species' habitat was "injury" and "harm" to that species
either when the habitat modification suppresses the species' population level at current levels, threatening the continued existence of the
species, or when the habitat modification prevents the species' population from recovering and increasing to an extent that species could
be removed from the Endangered Species List. Judge King explicitly
stated that an "injury" to a protected species did not require proof of
either the death of individual members of a species or a decline in
the species' population; he implicitly held that a finding of II injury II to
a listed species does not require proof of physical injury, serious or
otherwise, to individual members of a species. Judge King in Palila II
interprets "injury" as including II injury II to the entire species caused
by habitat modification that adversely affects a species' breeding,
feeding, or sheltering and prevents an increase of the species' population, when that species thereby is either threatened with extinction
or prevented from recovering.
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed225 Judge King's order in Palila II, on the grounds that
habitat destruction that could result in a species' extinction causes
Iharm."226 The Ninth Circuit in Palila II upheld, as not clearly erroneous, Judge King's findings that the state's action, permitting mouflon sheep in the Palila's designated critical habitat, constituted a
"taking" of the Palila's habitat.227 The Ninth Circuit held that lithe
district court's (and the Secretary's) interpretation of harm as including habitat destruction that could result in extinction, and findings to
that effect are enough to sustain an order for the removal of the
mouflon sheep."228 The Ninth Circuit did "not reach the issue of
whether the district court properly found that harm included habitat
degradation that prevents recovery of an endangered species." 229

223. rd. at 1082-83.
224. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club
v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
225. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th CiT. 1988).
226. rd. at 1110.
227. rd.
228. ld. (footnote omitted).
229. rd. at 1110-11. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit stated that its PaliZa II decision "held that the
definition of 'harm' in the [Endangered Species Act) includes habitat degradation that could
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In Palila II, the Ninth Circuit also held that the Fish and Wildlife
Service's 1981 regulation redefining "harm" "serves the overall purpose of the [Endangered Species Act] ... [and] is also consistent with
the policy of Congress evidenced by the legislative history."230 The
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," however, was not directly challenged as invalid in Palila II. The Ninth Circuit in Palila II implicitly
noted this fact when it stated - in addressing the state's argument
that the district court incorrectly interpreted the Act's definition of
"harm" to include habitat destruction which could drive the palila to
extinction-that "[w]e inquire whether the district court's interpretation is consistent with the Secretary's construction of the statute
since he is charged with enforcing the Act, and entitled to deference
if his regulation is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of
Congress. "231
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II did not cite or discuss the Supreme
Court's approach in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense
Council232 to judicial review regarding the validity of an agency's
statutory construction. The Ninth Circuit in Palila II, however, cited
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,233 for the proposition
that "the Secretary's construction of the statute [is] ... entitled to
deference if '. . . reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of
Congress."234 Riverside Bayview Homes 235 cites Chevron U.S.A. for the
proposition that "[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged
with enforcing is entitled to deference If it is reasonable and not in
conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. "236
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II stated that the Fish and Wildlife
Service's definition of "harm" "is entitled to deference if ... [the
regulation] is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of

result in extinction," but had "specifically declined to 'reach the issue of whether harm includes
habitat degradation that merely retards recovery."' National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.
R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Palila II, 852 F.2d at 1110-11). In Burlington, the
Ninth Circuit further stated that "in order to reach a similar finding of harm using our Palililll
analysis," the plaintiff "would have to show significant impairment of the species' breeding or
feeding habitats and prove that the habitat degradation prevents, or possibly retards, recovery
of the species." 23 F.3d at 1511. This recent statement by the Ninth Circuit indicates that the
Ninth Circuit today might affirm Judge King's holding in Palila II that "harm" to a species
occurs when the species' habitat is modified to an extent that it prevents recovery and delisting
of the species.
230. 852 F.2d at 1108.
231. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985».
232 467 U.s. 837 (1984).
233. 474 U.s. 121 (1985).
234. 852 F.2d at 1108.
235. 474 U.S. at 131.
236. Id. at 131 (citing Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 837).
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Congress."237 This analysis is essentially identical to

Chevron U.S.A.' s

requirements that a court and administrative agency are required to
follow the "clear" and "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."238

Chevron U.S.A.

also states that a court is required to follow

an agency's resolution of a specific statutory question and not substitute the court's own construction of a statutory provision when the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question
and the agency's interpretation of the statute is a "permissible construction"239 or a "reasonable interpretation"240 of the statute.

237. 852 F.2d at 1108.
238. 467 U.s. at 84243. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." ld. at 843 n.9. The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. indicated that a court is
permitted to use "traditional tools of statutory construction" to determine if there is "clear" and
"unambiguous" intent by Congress; "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect." 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.s. 421, 446-50 (1987); Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d
1285,1292-93 (D.c. Cir.), affd per curiam I7y equally divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989); Sweet Home
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement by Williams, J.), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859); see infra notes 379, 387-99, 435-61 and accompanying
text.
239. 467 U.S. at 843.
240. ld. at 844, 845. See infra note 393-94 and accompanying text. Chevron U.S.A. also
states, however, that "[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill" by "explicit"
"legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question," id. at 843-44, "there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." ld. (citations omitted). This arbitrary and
capricious standard of review under Chevron U.S.A. does not apply to the Fish and Wildlife
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," because this regulation was not promulgated under "an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation." ld. (emphasis added). Rather, the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of
"harm" was promulgated under section n(£), 16 U.S.c. § 1540(f) (1988), of the Endangered
Species Act, which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to promulgate such regulations as
may be appropriate to enforce this chapter," which is "implicit" "legislative delegation" to the
Fish and Wildlife Service on the "particular question" of how "harm" should be defined, see 467
U.s. at 844, thus requiring a court under Chevron U.S.A. to defer to, and uphold, the Service's
1981 redefinition of "harm" if it is a "reasonable interpretation" of the Endangered Species Act.
ld.
Judge Silberman's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Judge Mikva and Judge Wald, in
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), raised the issue of whether
Chevron U.S.A. was inapplicable to judicial review of the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm"
because "we are dealing with a criminal statute." See infra notes 321-461 and accompanying
text; if. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 & nn.9-10 (1992)
(plurality opinion). "That is to say, the Chevron U.S.A. presumption-that Congress has
delegated primary authority to the administrative agency to reconcile ambiguities in statutory
language-may not apply when the statute contemplates criminal enforcement. Cf Kelley v.
EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107 (D.c. Cir. 1994). The petitioner does not raise that concern, but it
surely is not a separate claim that the petitioner has affirmatively waived." Sweet Home
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 194 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The issue of whether

204

J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 10:2

In PaUla II, the Ninth Circuit, in addressing the state's argument
that the district court erred in interpreting the definition of "harm"
under the Endangered Species Act to include habitat destruction that
could drive an endangered species to extinction, emphasized that the
Secretary of the Interior, when promulgating the redefinition of
"harm" in 1981, "noted that harm include[d] not only direct physical
injury, but also injury caused by impairment of essential behavior
patterns via habitat modification that can have significant and permanent effects on a listed species."241 The Ninth Circuit also stated
that the Secretary of the Interior, in the 1981 notice promulgating the
redefinition of "harm," "let stand the district court's construction of
harm in PaliZa I ... [that] include[d] habitat destruction that could
result in the extinction of the Palila-exactly the same type of injury
at issue here. "242
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the district court's inclusion
within the definition of harm of habitat destruction that could drive
the Palila to extinction falls within the Secretary's interpretation."243
Thus, the Ninth Circuit implicitly found that the district court deferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" and had

Chevron U.S.A. applies when a statute contemplates criminal enforcement also was not addressed in Palila II. This issue arguably is present in Sweet Home I, Sweet Home 11 and in PaliZa 11

because the Endangered Species Act's prohibition of taking endangered and threatened species
is subject to enforcement through criminal penalties, as well as through civil penalties and
injunctive relief. See supra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
No statement by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. indicates that the Chevron standard
of judicial review regarding an agency's interpretation of a statute is inapplicable when the
statute is subject to criminal enforcement or when the agency's statutory interpretation is at
issue in a criminal prosecution. The plurality opinion in Thompson/Center Anns Co. cited by
Judge Silberman addresses the issue of the applicability in a civil setting of the rule of lenity in
construing a criminal statute, not the issue of the application of the Chevron U.S.A. standard in
a civil case to a statute that can be enforced through a criminal prosecution. The opinion in
Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d at 1107, which was cited by Judge Silberman also failed to address the
issue of the applicability of Chevron U.S.A. to a statute subject to criminal enforcement.
Denying a petition for rehearing of Kelley v. EPA in Michigan v. EPA, 38 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2068 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Judge Silberman indicated that the issue presented in Kelley was whether
Chevron U.S.A. should apply "[w]hen Congress treats an agency only as a prosecutor without
specific authority to issue regulations bearing on the questions prosecuted." Michigan, 38 Env't
Rep. Cas. at 2072. Under the Endangered Species Act, however, Congress has given the Fish
and Wildlife Service authority "to promulgate such regulations as may be appropriate to
enforce" the Act. 16 U.S.c. § 1533(d) (1988). Because the judges deciding Sweet Home I, Sweet
Home 11 and Palila 11 applied the Chevron U.S.A. standard to determine the validity of the Fish
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," this article will not further address the issue
of whether a standard other than the Chevron U.S.A. standard should be applied by a court to
determine the validity of the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm.·
241. 852 F.2d at 1108 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3».
242. Id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749-50 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3) and Palila I, 471 F.
Supp. at 985).
243. Id.
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"not substitute[d] its own construction of a statutory provision," as
required by Chevron U.S.A.244
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II then found that the Secretary's
inclusion of habitat destruction that could result in extinction within
the definition of "harm" "follow[ed] the plain language of the statute,
. . . which is 'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved.... ' 16 U.S.c. § 1531(b). The definition serves the overall
purpose of the Act since it conserves the Palila's threatened ecosystem."245 The Ninth Circuit also added:
The Secretary's construction of harm is also consistent with the policy of Congress evidenced by the legislative history. For example, in
the Senate Report on the Act: '"Take' is defined in ... the broadest
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." ... The
House Report said that the "harassment" form of taking would
"allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might
disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise
their young." ... If the "harassment" form of taking includes activities so remote from actual injury to the bird as birdwatching, then
the "harm" form of taking should include more direct activities,
such as the mouflon sheep preventing any mamane from growing
to maturity.246

Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly find a clear, unambiguous congressional intent on the issue of whether "harm" included
significant habitat modification within the meaning of the Chevron
U.S.A. doctrine, the Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the "plain language"
and legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, held that the
Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" was a "reasonable interpretation" and a "permissible construction" of the Act
within the meaning of Chevron U.S.A.
D. Validity of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Definition of Harm

The Palila II holding should be followed and upheld by other
courts because the Ninth Circuit's deference to the Service's redefinition of "harm" is consistent with the Supreme Court's application of
Chevron U.S.A. in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 1nc. 247 In
Riverside Bayview, the Supreme Court stated that under Chevron

467 U.S. at 844.
245. 852 F.2d at 1108.
244.

246. Id. at 1108-09 (citations omitted).

247. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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U.S.A., judicial review of an agency's inte~pretation of a statute was
lllimited to the question whether ... [the agency's exercise of jurisdiction was] reasonable, in light of the language, policies and legislative history of the Act. 11248 The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview
upheld, under this Chevron U.S.A. standard, Corps of Engineers'
regulations broadly defining IIwaters of the United States ll under the
Clean Water Act249 to include certain wetlands. This decision was
based on the grounds that the Clean Water Ads legislative history
indicated that Congress intended the term IIwaters of the United
States" to have a broad, expansive definition. 250 In Palila II, the Ninth
Circuit similarly found, after examining the language and the legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, that Congress intended
lltakell to be construed broadly and to protect the habitat of listed
species. This interpretation requires a court to uphold, under the
principles of Chevron U.S.A. and Riverside Bayview, the Service's definition of IIharmll as including Significant habitat modification.
In upholding the Service's definition of IIharm,1I the Ninth Circuit's approach in Palila II is also similar to the Supreme Court's
approach in Chevron U.S.A., where the EPA's interpretation of a provision251 of the Clean Air Act, with respect to a situation when the
statutory language and legislative history did not address the
specific issue in question, was upheld by the Supreme Court as lIa
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests. . . .
[Because] the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies. II252 The Endangered Species Act's IIregulatory scheme, II with respect to takings,
similarly can be characterized as IItechnical and complexll; the Fish
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" reconciled "conflicting policies II in lIa detailed and reasoned fashion."253
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II also stated, in a footnote that might
be interpreted as an alternate ground for holding the Service's definition of "harmll to be valid, that:
In addition, the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the
presumption that Congress is "aware of an administrative or

248. ld. at 131.
249. 33 U.s.c. § 1362(7) (1982).
250. See 474 U.S. at 133-34.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982).
252. 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
253. ld.
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judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts) that interpretation
when it reenacts a statute without change." 254
Apparently relying on this presumption, the Ninth Circuit in Palila
II, after tracing the evolution of the Service's redefinition of "harm,"
stated: "Congress presumably was aware of the current interpretation of harm when it amended the Act in 1982. But Congress did not
modify the taking prohibition in any matter. Thus Congress' failure
to act indicates satisfaction with the current definition of harm and

its interpretation by the Secretary and the judiciary."255
However, the Ninth Circuit's reliance in Palila II, upon a

principle

that applies when Congress "reenacts a statute without change," was
incorrect because the Endangered Species Act's definition of "take"
under section 3(19)256 was not reenacted by Congress in 1982.257
Consequently, this apparent alternative ground

in Palila II for

254. 852 F.2d at 1109 n.6 (citing Undahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768,
782 n.15 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.s. 575, 580-81 (1978»). The Pons case actually
dealt with Congress' enactment of a new law that incorporated sections of an earlier law. The
Supreme Court in Pons also stated that Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the judicial interpretation given to the earlier law incorporated into the new law,
at least insofar as it affects the new statute. 434 U.S. at 581. In Pons, the Supreme Court,
following the statement quoted in Lindahl and PaliZa II, cited Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 US. 405, 414 n.8 (1975), NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 US. 361, 366 (1951), and National
Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920). The Albermarle Paper Co. and Gullett Gin Co.
cases held that Congress, in reenacting a statutory provision,. approved of prior judicial or
administrative interpretations of the provision, when those judicial or administrative interpretations of the reenacted provision had been cited approvingly in Senate, House or Conference
Committee reports on the bill that reenacted the provision at issue. The National Lead Co. case
upheld an executive department's interpretation of a statutory provision which had been
reenacted by Congress, by simply stating that Congress, in reenacting a statutory provision,. "is
presumed to have legislated with knowledge of such an established usage of an executive
department of the Government." 252 U.S. at 147. In National Lead Co., however, unlike
Albermarle Paper Co. and Gullet Gin Co., the Supreme Court did not refer to citation or discussion of the department's interpretation of the statute in any committee reports on the bill that
reenacted the prOvision at issue.
255. 852 F.2d at 1109 n.6.
256. 16 U.s.c. § 1532(19) (1982).
257. See 852 F.2d at 1106, 1109 n.6; Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1472
(D.C. Cit. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cit. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 aan. 6,
1995) (No. 94-859). The only amendment in the 1982 Endangered Species Act relating to the
Act's takings prohibitions was the enactment of section 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(8)
(1988), which authorized the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue incidental takings permits. See
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 357-63, 428-34 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, although a House subcommittee conducting hearings on the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act had notice of the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981
redefinition of "harm," 50 C.F.R § 17.3 (1981), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in PaliZa 1, 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cit. 1981), neither the Service's redefinition nor PaliZa 1 were cited approvingly in
Senate or House reports on the 1982 amendments or in floor debates on the 1982 amendments,
see Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1469, unlike the situation in Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.s. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951).
See supra note 254.
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upholding the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm"
is not a valid legal argument. 258 However, the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine to uphold the Service's 1981
redefinition of "harm" is a sufficient and independent ground for upholding the regulation as valid under the Endangered Species Act.
In 1994, as a result of Judge Stephen F. Williams' change of position, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service's
inclusion of habitat modification within its definition of "harm" and
.alter~d a previous opinion,259 issued in 1993, that upheld the Fish
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm."260 A disagreement now exists between the Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia
Courts of Appeals as to whether the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981
regulation redefining "harm" is valid.

E. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt (Sweet Home I)
In 1993, the majority of this panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (per Chief Judge Abner Mikva),
rejected, in Sweet Home Clulpter v. Babbitt261 (Sweet Home 1), a faciallyvoid-for-vagueness challenge to the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981
redefinition of "harm"~62 and held, "per curiam, that the 'harm' regulation does not violate the ESA by including actions that modify habitat among prohibited 'takings."'263 Writing in Sweet Home I for a

258. See infra notes 364-78 and accompanying text.
259. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 17 F.3d
1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan.
6,1995) (No. 94-859).
260. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Later· in 1994, this
divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition for rehearing (with Chief Judge Abner
Mikva stating ,that he would grant the petition for rehearing). Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt,
30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), eert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The en bane
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion
for rehearing en bane (with four judges, including Chief Judge Mikva, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en bane). rd.
261. 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1993).
262. 1d. at 3-5.
263. ld. at 3. This suit, which was brought by "various organizations, businesses and
individuals, who depend directly or indirectly on the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest
and in the Southeast for their livelihood," Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279,281
(D.D.C 1992), affd sub. nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1994), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), eert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), challenged the validity of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," 50 CF.R. § 17.3 (1988), as well as the Service's
regulation, id. at § 17.31(a), extending to threatened species the Service's regulations
prohibiting takings of endangered species. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. The
district court rejected the plaintiff's challenges to these two regulations, granted the
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majority of the panel, Chief Judge Mikva stated that the Fish and
Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" would be held facially
void for vagueness in such a pre-enforcement challenge264 only if the
regulation was impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 265
This holding by Chief Judge Mikva was a correct decision. As
noted by Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I,266 the Supreme Court
has indicated261 that when a statute or regulation does not affect First
Amendment expressive freedoms,268 the statute or regulation will be

defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment 806 F. Supp. at'1Jj7.
264. The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I, who were "not currently the subject of an enforcement
action under 50 C.F.R § 17.3," 1 F.3d at 4, brought a civil suit directly challenging 50 C.F.R §
17.3 as facially void for vagueness.
265. 1 F.3d at 4.
266. Id.
261. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.s. 489, 495, 498 (1982); Smith v.
Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1914). The Goguen case was cited and discussed by Chief Judge
Mikva in Sweet Home I, 1 F.3d at 4.
268. Chief Judge Mikva did not explicitly hold in Sweet Home [ that the plaintiff's actions
regulated by 50 C.F.R § 17.3 were not protected First Amendment expressive freedoms, but he
did hold that, "the conduct implicated by this case is economic activity." "which modem
vagueness cases have invariably afforded less protection" than to First Amendment expressive
freedoms. 1 F.3d at 4. Chief Judge Mikva explained that the plaintiffs contended that 50 C.F.R.
§ 11.3 would "inhibit their ability to develop their land, especially by harvesting timber:' but
that "[t]o the degree that [plaintiffs] contend that the regulation results in a 'taking' of their
property in the Fifth Amendment sense, their remedy would be compensation, not a VOiding
of the regulation." 1 F.3d at 4. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), states that a statute
can be challenged as facially void for vagueness (even when it is not impermissibly vague in
all possible applications) when it "reaches, 'a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct,'" id. at 358 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982».
KDlender made clear, however, that such facial vagueness challenges are permitted only ·where
free speech or free association are affected" by the statute or regulation," 461 U.S. at 358 n.8,
because of the Supreme Court's "concern ... 'upon the potential for arbitrarily suppressing
First Amendment liberties.'· [d. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S.
87, 90 (1965». Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I similarly concluded that the reference to an
enactment implicating "constitutionally protected conduct" in Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982), was "referring primariIy to the First Amendment expressive
freedoms, which have long received special protection in vagueness cases." 1 F.3d at 4 (citing
Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.s. 566,573 (1914».
Even if a facial taking challenge was permitted under KDlender when a statute or regulation
constituted a taking of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and reached a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct" within
the meaning of KDlender, 461 U.s. at 358, the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I neither alleged nor
established that the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" constituted, in a
substantial amount of situations, a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I also did not allege or establish that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
reached a substantial amount of conduct that was free speech or free association protected
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chief Judge Mikva therefore
ruled correctly in Sweet Home I that the plaintiffs could not succeed in their facial void for
vagueness challenge "unless the regulation is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 1
F.3d at 4.
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held to be facially void for vagueness "only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. "269
Chief Judge Mikva also noted in Sweet Home I that the void for
vagueness doctrine requires "regulations with criminal sanctions [to]
'define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."'270 He stated that "[t]his principle, however, does not lead to
the conclusion that any person can have a regulation wiped off the
books, or prompt a limiting judicial construction of the regulation,
merely by showing that it will be impermissibly vague in the context
of some hypothetical application."271
Chief Judge Mikva found in Sweet Home I that the provision in
the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" requiring an act
that "actually kills or injures wildlife," and the requirement that the
government must prove that a party knowingly violated the statute
or regulation in order to establish a -civil or criminal violation272 of
the Endangered Species Act's "take" provision, were "features that
prevent [the regulation] from being invariably vague as applied. "273
Although the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I argued that the Service's
definition of "harm" was impermissibly vague in referring to, but not
defining, "significant" habitat modification, "significantly" impairing,
and "essential" behavioral patterns, 274. Chief Judge Mikva found that
"there are obviously types of activity, including habitat modification,
that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 clearly propibits without a hint of vagueness."275
He cited, as examples of conduct "obviously" forbidden by the

269. Sweet Home 1,1 F.3d at 4 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,

495 (1982».

270. Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.s. 352, 357 (1983». Although not stated by
Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I, "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is
not actual notice, but the other prindpal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. ... Kolender,461 U.S. at 357
(quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974». Another basic prindple of the vagueness
doctrine also not discussed by Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I is that a statute or regulation
"is not unconstitutional merely because it throws upon (persons] the risk of rightly estimating
a matter of degree." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914).
Consequently, words or phrases in a statute or regulation can be held to be certain enough for
vagueness doctrine purposes "notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to
which estimates might differ." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
271. 1 F.3d at 4.
272. 16 US.c. §§ 1540(a)-(b) (1988).
273. 1 F.3d at 4. Chief Judge Mikva added, "The Supreme Court has recognized that 'a
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy
of notice to the complainant that his conduct is prOscribed.'" Id. (quoting Village of Hoffman
Estates v. F1ipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982».
274. 1 F.3d at 4.
275. Id. at 4-5.
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regulation, "habitat modification that causes ascertainable physical
injury or death to an individual member of a listed species" and
"major acts of habitat degradation that destroy a species' ability to
breed, feed, or shelter. For instance, a person aware of the regulation
would undoubtedly be held accountable for clear-cutting an entire
forested area known to be populated by spotted owls."276
Because he correctly concluded that the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" was "not vague in all of its applications, II
Chief Judge Mikva held in Sweet Home I that the court "may not
declare it void on its face."277 He noted, however, that "[s]pecific
vagueness concerns about the regulation can be addressed when and
if they are properly raised in the framework of a concrete challenge
to a particular application of the regulation."278 As stated by the
district court in Sweet Home I, when a statute or regulation is not impermissibly vague in all of its possible applications, '"[v]agueness
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.'''279
A majority of the panel also held in Sweet Home I, "per curiam, that
the 'harm' regulation does not violate the [Endangered Species Act]
by including actions that modify habitat among prohibited 'takings.'''280 In his opinion for the court, Judge Mikva noted that the
plaintiffs argued that Congress did not intend to include habitat
modification within "harm" in the Act's definition of "take" and "that
the meaning of harm should therefore be limited to direct physical
injury to an identifiable member of a listed wildlife species."281 Judge
Mikva also noted, in a separate opinion concurring in this per curiam
holding, that the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I also argued that Congress,
although intending under the Endangered Species Act to halt injurious habitat modification, "did not mean to combat habitat degradation on private lands through the prohibition against takings in 16
U.S.c. § 1538 ... [and] that Congress intended to combat the problem solely through § 1534's provision for federal land acquisition."282

276. ld. at 5.
277. ld.
278. ld.

279. Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.s. 544, 550 (1975», affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1
F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and ,ev'd in part on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.
1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94859).
280. 1 F.3d at 3.
281. ld.
282 ld. at 8-9 (Mikva. C.}., concurring). 16 U.s.c. § 1534(a) (1988) (authorizing the
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture-in the case of National Forest System lands-to

212

J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 10:2

Chief Judge Mikva, in his separate concurring opinion, joined the
holding that the IIharmll definition does not violate the Endangered
Species Act on the grounds that lithe 'harm' regulation conflicts with
neither the [Endangered Species Act] itself nor its ambiguous legislative history and is unquestionably a permissible and reasonable construction of the statute"283 which a court must uphold under the
Chevron U.S.A.2M standard.
He noted in this concurring opinion that the plaintiffs' argument,
that the Act's "takingll provision was not intended to include habitat
modification, in part was based on the fact that the Endangered
Species Bill reported to the Senate by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1973 did not refer to habitat modification in its definition of
"take," although the definition of "take" in S. 1983-the first endangered species bill referred to the committee in 1973-included within
the definition of "take ll the IIdestruction, modification, or curtailment
of [an endangered species'] habitat or range II in the definition of
II take. "285 The plaintiffs argued that the Committee's deletion of
references to habitat modification in the reported bill's definition of
"take" "evince[d] Congress' intent not to include habitat modification
within the scope of prohibited 'takings.'''286 Chief Judge Mikva,
however, found the Act's IIlegislative history to be most ambiguous
regarding whether Congress intended to include habitat modification within the meaning of 'take,''' noting that there was no indication of why the Senate Commerce Committee excluded habitat
modification from the definition of IItake. 1I287 He asserted that the
Committee may have acted in this manner because the original bill
(5. 1983) would have made habitat modification a per se taking under
the Act. However, he stated that the Committee may not have intended to preclude the Fish and Wildlife Service from adopting, as it
did, a regulation providing that habitat modification constitutes a
taking when it causes actual injury or death to a protected species. 288

acquire land as part of "a program to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants, including those which
are listed as endangered or threatened species").
283. 1 F.3d at 8 (Mikva, c.J., concurring).
284. Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
infra notes 387-99, 434-61 and accompanying text.
285. 1d. at 9 (citing S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(6) (1973». See Sweet Home Chapter v.
Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94859); see infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
286. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, C.]., concurring).
287. 1d.
288. 1d. The district court in Sweet Home 1, whose judgment initially was affirmed by the
court of appeals, noted that:
S. 1983 was only one of two endangered species bills under consideration by the
Senate Committee on Commerce at that time. The other bill, S. 1592, defines 'take'

\
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Thus, Chief Judge Mikva found no clear Congressional intent to exclude habitat modification from the Act's definition of "take," noting
that the Senate Committee Report on its Endangered Species Bill
states that "'[t]ake' is defined ... in the broadest possible manner to
include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife. "289
The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I, in support of their argument that
the service's definition of "harm" was invalid, also referred to floor
statements290 by some members of Congress that allegedly suggested
that some members of Congress might have desired land acquisition
under section 5(a)291 of the Endangered Species Act to be the sole
method under the Act of dealing with habitat modification. 292 The
plaintiffs further argued that "Congress must have intended land
acquisition to be the exclusive mechanism for preventing such habitat modification. . .. Otherwise ... agency officials would always
choose the free alternative of prohibiting a damaging land use under
the 'take' provision, rather than paying to acquire the affected
land. "293
Chief Judge Mikva, however, found that "[n]othing in the language of 16 U.S.c. § 1534 or in the legislative history establishes that
Congress meant land acquisition to be the only mechanism for habitat protection on private lands."294 He asserted that the floor statements by individual members of Congress cited by the plaintiffs "'are
not a safe guide •.. in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the

exactly as it now appears in the statute. From this legislative history, the Court
can conclude no more than that the Senate chose to adopt the definition in one bill
over that in another. There is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of the
[Endangered 5pecies Act) to indicate that the Senate rejected the definition in S.
1983 specifically because it wanted to exclude habitat modification from the
definition of take. In fact, the Senate Report indicates just the opposite, that "take"
was being defined "in the broadest possible manner."
It may be, as defendants suggest, that the Senate rejected the definition of "take"
in S. 1983 because it did not want habitat modification per se to constitute a taking,
or it may be that the Senate chose to leave the decision of whether to define
takings to include habitat modification in the hands of the Secretary. However,
the Court will not rely upon such speculation to deduce legislative intent.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan. 806 F. 5upp. 279, 283 (D.D.C. 1992) (emphasis added), aff'd sub
nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 17
F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714
aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
289. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, c.J., concurring) (quoting 5. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1973».
290. Id. (citing 119 CONGo REC. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (including statement of Sen.
Tunney) and 119 CONGo REc. 525,691 (1973) (including statement of Sen. Nelson».
291. 16 U.s.c. § 1534(a) (1988).
292. See 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, C.J., concurring).
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. Id.
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law-making body,"'295 and that the statements cited "do not establish
that even the speakers themselves intended land acquisition to be the
exclusive protective mechanism for habitats on private lands."296 He
also argued that extending the Act's taking prohibition to habitat
modification on private land would not make land acquisition under
section 5297 of the Act a nullity. The Act would be valid because
federal wildlife managers might wish to acquire private lands, rather
than simply forbidding damaging activity on private lands under the
Act's taking prohibition, because they could engage in more
protective conservation programs on "preserves," "owned and
controlled" by the federal government. 298
Chief Judge Mikva then rejected, in Sweet Home I, the plaintiffs'
argument that under the noscitur a sociis principle of statutory construction299 the Fish and Wildlife Service must narrowly interpret
"harm" to exclude habitat modification. The plaintiffs asserted that
the other words used in the Act's definition of "take" do not apply to
land use that only indirectly injures wildlife.3OO Chief Judge Mikva
rejected the plaintiffs' argument on the grounds that other terms
used in the Act's definition of "take," such as "harass," "can limit a
private landowner's use of his land in a rather broad manner ... to
suppress activities that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species. "301
Finally, Chief Judge Mikva concluded in his concurring opinion
in Sweet Home I that the enactment by Congress in 1982 of section
10(a)(1)(B)302 of the Act "strongly suggests that Congress did in fact
intend to include habitat modification within the meaning of
'take.'"303 Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the Act authorizes the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue a permit authorizing any "taking otherwise prohibited by [16 U.S.c. § 1538 (a)(l)(B)] if such taking is incidental to,
and not [sic] the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful

at 10 (quoting Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,474 (1921».
(Mikva, c.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
297. 16 U.S.c. § 1534 (1988).
298. 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, c.J., concurring). See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463,1466 (D.c. Cir. 1994); see infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
299. "[U]nder the principle of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis, a general
term in a list should be interpreted narrowly 'to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the
Acts of C;ongress.'" 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, c.J., concurring) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961» (emphasis added).
300. ld. (Mikva, c.J., concurring).
301. 1d.; see infra notes 311, 316, 326-39, 400-10 and accompanying text.
302. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(I)(B) (1988).
303. 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, C.}., concurring).
295. ld.

296. ld.
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activity."304 Chief Judge Mikva found that Congress' enactment of
section 10(a)(1)(B), which authorizes the issuance of a permit for
"incidental takings," "implicitly confirmed" that incidental takings,
which he interprets as including habitat modification,30s "were otherwise forbidden by the Act. "306
Chief Judge Mikva concluded his concurring opinion in Sweet
Home I by stating that "[o]verall, there is nothing in the [Endangered
Species Act] or in its legislative history that unambiguously demonstrates that the term 'take' does not encompass habitat modification"307 and that "Chevron commands that unless it is absolutely clear
that an agency's interpretation of a statute, entrusted to it to administer, is contrary to the will of Congress, courts must defer to that
interpretation so long as it is reasonable."308
Judge Stephen Williams also wrote a separate opinion in Sweet
Home I concurring in section Il(A)(1) of the majority's opinion, in
which he stated that he agreed that the Service's definition of "harm"
"complies with the Endangered Species Act-but only because of the
1982 amendments to the [Act]."309 Judge Williams added that the
enactment in 1982 of section 10(a)(1)(B), authorizing permits for
incidental takings, "support[s] the inference that the [Endangered
Species Act] otherwise forbids some such incidental takings, including some habitat modification. "310 He concluded his concurring
opinion, however, by stating that "but for the 1982 amendments, I
would find Judge Sentelle's analysis highly persuasive-including
his discussion of the noscitur a sociis canon. "311
Judge Sentelle dissented in Sweet Home I, arguing that while the
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine requires a court to defer to an agency's

304. Under section 10(a)(1)(B), a person "whose activities might incidentally 'take'
members of an endangered species can get advance protection from legal liability, but only if
they convince the Secretary that [their habitat conservation] plan uses the maximum devices
possible to mitigate and minimize species loss, and that the rE;Sulting losses will not unduly
hann the species." Sweet Home Otapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added). See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
305. See 1 F.3d at 11 (Mikva, C.]., concurring) ("[I]t is hard to imagine what 'incidental
takings' might be other than habitat modification. ").
306. Id.; see infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text; see also Sweet Home Otapter v.
Babbitt 17 F.3d 1463, 1467-69 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 11S S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94859); id. at 1477-78 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting); see also infra notes 357-66, 428-34 and accompanyingtext.
307. 1 F.3d at 11.
308. Id. (quoting Otevron U.s.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.s. 837, 844
(1984».
309. Id. at 11 (Williams, ]., concurring).
310. Id.
311. Id.

(citing RLEA v. NMB, 988 F.2d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, ]., dissenting)
(characterizing the canon as a "powerful linguistic norm"».
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reasonable and consistent interpretation of a statute, which is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the issue,312 he could "see no reasonable way that the term 'take' can be defined to include 'significant
habitat modification or degradation' as it is defined in 50 C.F.R. §
17.3. "313 He analogized the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of
"harm" to a hypothetical agency regulation, prohibiting "chewing
and spitting of tobacco," purportedly promulgated under a federal
statute authorizing the posting of "No Smoking" signs, under which
"smoking" was defined to include "lighting, burning, puffing, inhaling, and otherwise employing the noxious nicotine-bearing tobacco
products."314 He argued that in both the case of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's definition of "harm" and his hypothetical regulation, the
agency engaged in an "unreasonable expansion of terms."31S
Judge Sentelle also invoked the noscitur a sociis principle of
statutory construction. He argued that all the terms other than
"harm" that are used in the definition of "take" under the Endangered
Species Act:
relate to an act which a specifically acting human does to a specific
individual representative of a wildlife species. In fact, they are the
sorts of things an individual ... commonly does when he intends to
"take" an animal. Otherwise put, if I were intent on taking a rabbit,
a squirrel, or a deer, as the term "take" is used in common English
parlance, I would go forth with my dogs or my guns or my snares
and proceed to "harass, ... pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect" one of the target species. 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19). If
I succeeded in that endeavor, I would certainly have "taken" the
beast. If I failed, I would at least have "attempt[ed] to engage in ...
such conduct."316

According to Judge Sentelle, the unreasonableness of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" was not alleviated by the statement in the Senate Commerce Committee's report that "'take' is
defined ... in the broadest possible manner,"317 because that legislative history did not convince him that Congress "intended to deprive
the definition of any bounds whatsoever and tum the word into a

312. 1d. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
313. 1d. at 12 (interpreting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993». Judge Sentelle asserted that the second

prong of the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine places limits on the judiciary'S power to question administrative actions. Id. (citing Nuclear Info. Resources Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 986
F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
314. ld. at 11-12.
315. 1d. at 12.
316. 1d. at 12 &: n.1 ("The only word replaced by ellipses is "harm," the word under examination."); see also infra notes 328-39, 400-08 and accompanying text.
317. Id. at 12 (quoting S. REP. NO. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973».
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free form concept inclusive of anything an agency might wish it to
cover. "318
Finally, Judge Sentelle asserted that the Service's definition of
"harm" violated "the presumption against surplusage" principle of
statutory construction.319 The Service's definition of "harm" made
every other term in the Act's definition "superfluous" since "[e]very
single one of those acts .•. falls within the definition of 'harm' as
understood by the agency."320

F. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt (Sweet Home II)
On petition for rehearing, Judge Sentelle's position in Sweet
Home I prevailed, with Judge Williams changing his earlier position,
without additional oral arguments or additional briefing.321 Judge
William's majority opinion in Sweet Home II held "invalid the Fish &
Wildlife Service regulation defining 'harm' to embrace habitat modifications."322 In Sweet Home 11,323 Judge Williams held that the Service's regulation defining "harm" was invalid because the definition
"was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute, see OJevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, ... [and1 no later action of Congress supplied the
missing authority. "324

318. Id. at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1473 (D.c. Cir.1994) (Sweet Home 11)

(Mikva, q., dissenting), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714
Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
322. Id. at 1472. Later in 1994, this divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition
for rehearing. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), eert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Williams issued a statement, which was joined by
Judge Sentelle, in support of his vote to deny the petition for rehearing; this statement
defended and interpreted his decision in Sweet Home 11. ld. at 191-93. Chief Judge Mikva
stated that he would grant the petition for rehearing. Id. at 191. At the same time that the
panel denied the appellees' petition for rehearing, the en bane United States Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion for rehearing en bane. Id. at 191.
Four judges, including Chief Judge Mikva, dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane. Id.
at 194.
On January 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the federal government's
petition for certiorari in this case to address the validity on its face of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's regulation that makes significant habitat modification a prohibited taking under the
Endangered Species Act. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94859). Oral arguments in this case are scheduled for April 17, 1995.
323. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Sweet Home Il), reh'g
denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
324. Id. at 1464 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837,842-44 (1984». Chief Judge Mikva, who wrote the opinion for the court in Sweet Home 1, 1
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), dissented in Sweet Home II" 17 F.3d at 1473-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting).
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Although Judge Williams referred to the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine
in the court's Sweet Home II holding, his decision invalidating the
Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" violated the Chevron
U.S.A. doctrine. The court violated Chevron U.S.A. because it erroneously imposed its own construction of the statute's definition of
"harm" instead of deferring to the Service's reasonable interpretation
of "harm."325 In reversing his earlier position, Judge Williams first
relied on the noscitur a sociis maxim of statutory construction.326
After concluding that the word "harm" could be broadly and variously construed "[als a matter of pure linguistic possibility,"327
Judge Williams found that all of the words except "harm" in the
Endangered Species Act's definition of "take" "contemplate the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken,"328
although in some cases "the application of force may not be instantaneous or immediate, and the force may not involve a bullet or
blade."329
Judge Williams then approvingly discussed United States v.
Hayashi,330 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
term "harass" in the definition of "take" under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act.331 The court in Hayashi held that the defendant's
firing of a rifle into water behind porpoises did not "harass" the porpoises in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, because
the defendant's acts were not "direct and significant intrusions upon
the mammal's ordinary activities."332 The Ninth Circuit in Hayashi
reasoned that:

325. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844.
326. 17 F.3d at 1465; see supra notes 299-301, 311, 316 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 400-14 and accompanying text.
327. 17 F.3d at 1464.
328. Id. at 1465.
329. Id. Judge Williams added:
In the case of "pursue", the perpetrator does not necessarily catch or destroy the
animal, but pursuit would always or almost always be a step toward deliberate
capture or destruction, and so would be picked up by § 1532(19)'s reference to
"attempt[s)". While one may "trap" an animal without being physicany present,
the perpetrator wiJI have previously arranged for release of energy that directly
captures the animal. And one may under some circumstances "harass" an animal
by aiming sound or light in its direction, but the waves and particles are themselves physical forces launched by the perpetrator.
Id.

330. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993).
331. 17 F.3d at 1465 (citing Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1282). Under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to take a marine mammal, 16 U.S.c. 1372(a)(2)(A)
(1988), "take" is defined as activity which may "harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal." 16 U.S.c. § 1362(13) (1988).
332 5 F.3d at 1282.
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The [Marine Mammal Protection Act] (MMPA) groups "harass"
with "hunt," "capture," and "kill" as forms of prohibited "taking."
The latter three each involve direct, sustained, and significant intrusions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of a marine mammal; killing is a direct and permanent intrusion, while hunting and
capturing cause significant disruptions of a marine mammal's
natural state. Consistent with these other terms, "harassment," to
constitute a taking under the MMPA, must entail a similar level of
direct and sustained intrusion.333
Judge Williams asserted in Sweet Home II that:
[T]he nine verbs accompanying "harm" [in the Endangered Species
Act's definition of "take"] all involve a substantially direct application of force, which the Service's concept of forbidden habitat modification altogether lacks.334
In effect, Judge Williams in Sweet Home II held that to "take" a
protected species in violation of the Endangered Species Act, a person must exert direct force (although not necessarily instantaneous
or immediate force) against a protected animaI.335 Under this reasoning, killing or injuring an animal indirectly through habitat modification can never be held to be a "take" of a protected species under the
Endangered Species Act, as "harm," "harass," or any of the other
terms used in the Act to define "take."336
Judge Williams, in further support of this interpretation of "take"
under the Act, asserted in Sweet Home II that "[t]he implications of
the Service's definition suggest its improbable relation to congressional intent."337 After noting the large amount of land that may be
needed for the survival of the grizzly bear and the criminal penalties
for knowing violations of the Endangered Species Act's takings

333.Id.

334. 17 F.3d at 1465. "Of course, each of the terms in the 'take' definition itself implies
some degree of habitat modification. Setting a trap for an animal certainly modifies its habitat,
as in a slightly different sense, does firing bullets at it. This obviously does not imply that
habitat modifications as the Service uses the term are also encompassed." Id. at 1465 n.1.
335. Id at 1465.
336. Although not cited by Judge Williams in his opinion in Sweet Home 11, California v.
Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (CD. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 683 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Secretary of Interior v. California, 464
U.S. 312 (1984), adds support to his claim that the Endangered Species Act requires direct
application of force against a protected animal. In California v. Watt, the court held that the
proposed leasing of tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf, for oil and gas exploration, did not
constitute a "take" under the Endangered Species Act, either as "harm," "attempted harm," or
"harass," under the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definitions of those terms, see supra notes
128-48 and accompanying text, even assuming that the leasing constituted a threat to the
continued survival of a species protected under the Endangered Species Act, because the Act
requires a more immediate injury. 520 F. Supp. at 1387.
337. 17 F.3d at 1465.
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prohibitions, Judge Williams stated that lithe gulf between the
Service's habitat modification concept of 'harm' and the other words
of the statutory definition, and the implications in terms of the
resulting extinction of private rights, counsel application of the maxim noscitur a sociis."338 Judge Williams asserted that lithe Service's
interpretation appears to yield precisely the 'unintended breadth'
that use of the maxim properly prevents."339
An additional reason given by Judge Williams in support of his
holding in Sweet Home II was that "[t]he [Endangered Species] Act
addresses habitat preservation in two ways - the federal land acquisition program and the directive to federal agencies to avoid adverse
impacts."340 Judge Williams found that the legislative history with
respect to the Endangered Species Act's federal land acquisition program "confirms the intention to assign the primary task of habitat
preservation to the govemment."341 "[T]he floor managers [of the
338. Id. Judge Williams later explained in his statement Goined by Judge Sentelle) in
denying the appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home II, that this
grizzly example ... "makes quite clear that the panel understood that the regulation addressed habitat modifications that would be fatal to members of the species. It refers to a contention that "as many as 35 million to 42 million acres of land
are necessary to the survival of grizzlies." If that habitat is "necessary to [the
grizzlies') survivaL" then any material curtailment must involve de!lth for members of the species.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.)
(citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1465), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
339. 17 F.3d at 1465 (noting that the Supreme Court stated in Janecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961), that this maxim is usually applied to avoid giving an unintended
. breadth to Congress' Acts when a word is ambiguous); see supra notes 299-301, 311, 316 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 400-08 and accompanying text. Judge Williams in Sweet
Home II referred to the statement in Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990), ~at "words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning." 17 F.3d at 1466.
340. 17 F.3d at 1466. The federal land acquisition program to which Judge Williams
referred is pursuant to section 5 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. § 1534 (1988). The
directive to federal agencies to avoid adverse impacts to which Judge Williams referred is in
section 7 of the Act, id. § 1536. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
341. 17 F.3d at 1466. Judge Williams referred to floor statements by Representative
Sullivan, the floor manager of the House version of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 in
which Representative Sullivan stated that H.R 37 (the house version of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973):
will meet this problem [of adverse impacts on wildlife from destruction of their
habitat) by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat through the use of
the land and water conservation fund. It will also enable the Department of
Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the
protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so
at excessive cost to themselves.
Id. (quoting 119 Congo Rec. H30,162 (daily ed' Sept. 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Sullivan».
According to Judge Williams, "Representative Sullivan saw the Act as providing duties for the
government [for habitat modification), with private persons acting only in the form of 'willing
landowners' assisted by the Department of Agriculture.· Id. Judge Williams also quoted the
following statement by Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the Senate version of the
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House and Senate versions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973]
differentiated loss of habitat from the hazard that was the target of
the 'taking' ban and the other prohibitions of § 9."342 He then stated
that "Congress's deliberate deletion of habitat modification from the
definition of 'take' strengthens ... [the] conclusion,"343 and that "in
rejecting the Service's understanding of 'take' to encompass habitat
modification, 'we are mindful that Congress had before it, but failed
to pass, just such a scheme. "'344
Judge Williams, in his subsequent statement Goined in by Judge
Sentelle) in denying the appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet
Home II, noted that:
The government argues that the panel misstated the legislative
history when it suggested a parallel between the ban on habitat
modification retained in the Act as applied to federal government
actors, 17 F.3d at 1466, and the "habitat modification" explicitly
deleted [in § 9] from the draft provision governing private actors,
id. at 1467. See Petition at 8. The panel made the point both in
noting the apparent structure of the Act (contrasting the imposition
of "very broad burdens" on a narrow segment of society, the federal
government, and relatively narrow burdens on all others), and in
suggesting the significance of the Senate Committee's deletion of

Endangered Species Act of 1973: "Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to
conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction." ld. (quoting
119 Congo Rec. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24,1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney»; see supra notes 29098 and accompanying text.
342 17 F.3d at 1466. In support of this latter statement, Judge Williams once again quotes:
Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill
them for pleasure or profit. There is no way that the Congress can make it less
pleasurable for a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less
profitable for them to do so.
ld. (quoting 119 CONGo REC. H30,162 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Sullivan)
(emphasis added by Judge Williams». Judge Williams then quoted the following floor statement by Senator Tunney:
Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction
of their natural habitats, a significant portion of those animals are subject to predation by man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S.
1983 would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of
endangered species except where permitted by the Secretary.
17 F.3d at 1466-67 (quoting 119 CONGo REC. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (emphasis added
by Judge Williams».
343. 17 F.3d at 1467. Judge Williams then discussed the fact that S. 1983, as introduced to
the Senate Commerce Committee in 1973, defined "take" to include "the destruction, modification, or curtailment of [a species'] habitat or range," id., but that the definition of "take" in the
version of the Endangered Species Bill reported out of the Committee to the Senate deleted the
language in the original version of S. 1983 referring to habitat modification. ld. (citing 119
CONGo REC.S25,663 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney»; see supra notes 285-89
and accompanying text.
344. 17 F.3d at 1467 (quoting John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. CO. V. Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 526 (1993».
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the bill's reference to "habitat modification" as one of the ways in
which a person might "take" members of an endangered species.
The suggested parallelism is false, says the government, because the
statutory ban on habitat modifications by federal agencies is far
broader, reaching such modifications "whether destruction of the
habitat would actually kill or injure the species. "345

Judge Williams responded in this statement by asserting that "the
government misrepresents,"346 and first concluded that section
7(a)(2)'s prohibition of "destruction or adverse modification of
habitat ... which is determined ... to be critical,"347 "seems to be
simply another way of referring to habitat modifications so significant to the species that they might lead to death, or at least some
very serious injury, for members of the species."348 Judge Williams
also stated an inability "to discern any substantive, operational difference" between the Service's regulations [50 C.F.R. § 17.94 (1993)]
governing "modifications of 'critical' habitat," and the Service's regulations defining "harm" under section 9 to include habitat modification.349 Judge Williams in this statement also referred to "the virtual
identity between what the Senate deleted from § 9 and what it
retained in § 7."350 He said this was recognized by Michael Bean,
Senior Counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund, when Bean
wrote that "'if 'taking' comprehends habitat destruction, then it is at
least doubtful whether Section 7 of the Act is even necessary.'''351
Section 7, however, imposes procedures upon federal agencies
that are designed to protect endangered and threatened species. 352
These procedures are not imposed upon persons under section 9 of
the Endangered Species Act. Consequently, section 9 does not simply duplicate section 7(a)(2) if section 9 is interpreted to prohibit
habitat modifications proscribed by the Fish and Wildlife Service's
1981 redefinition of "harm."
Judge Williams' analysis in denying the appellees' petition for rehearing in Sweet Home II also ignores the differences in habitat protection under sections 7 and 9 discussed previously in this article. 353
In particular, Judge Williams fails to discuss section 7(a)(2)'s

345. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of
Williams, J.) (citation omitted), eerl. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
346. Id.
347. 16 U.S.c. § 1S36(a)(2) (1988).
348. 30 F.3d at 192.
349. Id.; see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
350. 30 F.3d at 192.
351. Id. (quoting MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL WILDLIFE LAw 397 (1977).
352 See supra note 117.
353. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.

1995]

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

223

alternative prohibition of conduct that may "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species,"354 and he
also fails to consider the significance of the fact that section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act only applies to actions "authorized, funded
or carried out" by a federal agency, whereas section 9 applies to any
person, including private individuals, corporations, and state and
local governments and their agents and employees.355 Even if in
some situations habitat modification might be prohibited by both
sections 9 and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, Congress is not
prohibited from subjecting the same act to regulation and/ or

354. See supra notes 116-17, 121-24 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
Judge Williams also argued, in his subsequent statement in support of denial of the
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home II, that "[t]o the extent that there may be some
theoretical difference between habitat modification under § 7 and under the Department's
regulations purporting to implement § 9, practical realties limit ... [§ 9's] role to pure theory,"
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.),
art. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), because modification that would
constitute a prohibited taking under the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" may only
proceed pursuant to an "incidental taking" permit under section 10(a), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)
(1988), of the Endangered Species Act, see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text, and
because "the Department [of Interior] explicitly recognizes the restrictions that it imposes
under § 10(a) as 'equivalent' to those it imposes under § 7 to protect 'critical habitat. "' 30 F.3d
at 192-93 (citing Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California
Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,088-90 (Dec. 10, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (taking
permitted under a § 10(a) plan for California gnatcatcher '''will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival and recovery of the gnatcatcher in the wild; this criteria is equivalent to
the regulatory definition of 'jeopardy' under section 7(a)(2) of the Act'").
Judge Williams' assertion. that habitat conservation plans under section 10(a) incidental
taking permits are equivalent to restrictions imposed under section 7 to protect "critical
habitat" is not supported by the citation to the gnatcatcher special rule, however, because the
quotation from the special gnatcatcher rule refers to the jeopardy clause of section 7(a)(2), a
clause which is separate and distinct from section 7(a)(2)'s prohibition of the destruction or
alteration of des~gnated critical habitat. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Even if this
assertion by Judge Williams is correct, section 7(a)(2) would not prohibit modification of a
species' habitat that is not designated critical habitat unless the habitat modification would
violate section 7(a)(2)'s prohibition against action that may jeopardize the continued existence
of a species (by threatening the species with extinction). See supra notes 121-24 and accompanyingtext.
Judge Williams' assertion in this statement also fails to recognize, as does Judge Williams'
earlier opinion in Sweet Home II, see infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text, that if section 9
does not apply to habitat modification. habitat conservation plans under section 10(a)
incidental take permits would not regulate habitat modification. Also, section 7(a)(2) would
regulate the modification of habitat only if the modification was caused by "action authorized,
funded, or carried out" by a federal agency and the habitat modification either may threaten
the continued existence of the species or would destroy or adversely modify designated critical
habitat. Section 7(a)(2) does not regulate modification of habitat that has not been designated
as critical habitat and which would not threaten the species with extinction. See supra notes
114-27 and accompanying text.
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punishment (even criminal) under two different statutory provisions.356
Judge Williams I opinion in Sweet Home II, also examined the
significance of the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act.
He noted that lithe only legislative act [in 1982) from which the
government claims support II was the enactment in 1982 of sections 10
(a)(l)(B) & (a)(2)357 of the Endangered Species Act, which authorize
the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue incidental take permits. 358 He
concluded that these 1982 amendments had neither sufficiently
lIaltered the context of the definition of ltakel as to render the
Services1s [sic] interpretation reasonable, or even, conceivably, to
reflect express congressional adoption of that view,1I nor, by bringing
lithe Service1s regulation and a judicial interpretation to the attention
of a ... subcommittee, [did they] constitute[ ] a ratification of the
regulation. 11359
Judge Williams held in Sweet Home II that the incidental taking
permits authorized by section 10 (a) (1) (B) of the Endangered Species
Act do not include the habitat modifications included within the Fish
and Wildlife Service1s definition of IIharm.1I360 He found that lithe
problem of incidental takings II are posed by lI[h]arms involving the
direct applications of force that characterize the nine other verbs of §
1532 (19),11 such as when lI[t]he trapping of a nonendangered animal
... may incidentally trap an endangered species;1361 He stated that
lithe key example of the sort of problem to be corrected by §
10(a)(1)(B) involved the immediate destruction of animals that would
be trapped by a human enterprise, II where eggs of a protected species
would be immediately destroyed by being crushed or captured lias a
direct result of a human enterprise, II when entrained or impinged by
a nuclear power plant water intake structure.362 Judge Williams
concluded his analysis of this issue by finding that the enactment of
356. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (stating that Congress is not
prohibited by Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution from subjecting a person to criminal punishment under one statute, and remedial civil
sanctions under another statutory proviSion for the same act).
357. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1539 (a)(1)(8) & (a)(2) (1988).
358. See supra notes 54-56, 302-06, 310-11 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 428-34
and accompanying text.
359. 17 F.3d at 1467 (emphasis added). In addition. Senator Gam in 1982 withdrew a
proposed bill that would have been "a wholesale 'rewrite,'" of the Endangered Species Act and
would have excluded "effects from normal forestry, farming, ranching, or water management
practices: from the Act's definition of "take." Id. at 1469 & n.3. Judge Williams concluded in
Sweet Horne II that "[t)he record reveals nothing to suggest any relation between Senator Gam's
decision and congressional sentiment on the habitat modification issue." Id. at 1469.
360. Id. at 1467-68.
361. Id. at 1467.
362. Id. (emphasis added).
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the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental taking permit provision "involved
no assumptions supporting the Service's position on habitat modification. So far as the creation of the permit plan is concerned, the
implicit assumptions simply do not embrace the idea that 'take' included any significant habitat modification injurious to wildlife."363
Regarding the federal government's alternative theory that Congress in 1982 ratified the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of
"harm" in the process of amending the Endangered Species Act,
Judge Williams in Sweet Home II interpreted references in the 1982
Conference Report364 regarding the 1982 amendments to "habitat
conservation" under seCtion 10 (a) of the Act, as referring to the fact
"that relief under the § 10 (a) permit scheme would include habitat
conservation [and] does not imply an assumption that takings encompass habitat modification."365 Judge Williams added that "although §
10(a) relief contemplates advancing 'the interest of endangered species', it does not follow that every act detrimental to an endangered
species constitutes a forbidden taking."366
Judge Williams also held that awareness by a congressional subcommittee of the Service's redefinition of "harm" and of the Ninth
Circuit's Palila I decision,367 upholding the application of the Endangered Species Act to habitat modification, would not be interpreted as ratification by Congress of the Service's 1981 redefinition of
"harm, "368 when there was no showing that "congressional awareness
of the Service's regulation or of Palila [1] reached the floor of either
House."369 He based this holding on analysis370 of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court371 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,372 which he concluded "may

at 1468.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982
US.C.C.A.N.2871-72).
365. 17 F.3d at 1468 (emphasis added).
366. Id. at 1469. Judge Williams, later in his opinion in Sweet Home II, added that Congress'
"creation of the permit scheme is fully consistent with the meaning of 'take' as enacted in 1973."
Id. at 1472.
367. Palila v: Hawaii Dep't of Land of & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
368. 17 F.3d at 1472.
369. Id. at 1469.
370. Id.at1469L72.
371. Id. (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 US. 825 (1988); Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
US. 220 (1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US. 121 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Board
of Comm'rs, 435 US. 110 (1978».
372. 17 F.3d at 1471 (citing Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.c. Cir. 1989».
363. Id.
364. Id.
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ultimately not be fully reconcilable. 1I373 These decisions address the
issue of when Congress' action or inaction constitutes ratification of
an earlier judicial or administrative agency interpretation of a
statute.
Judge Williams concluded that lI[a]lthough the precedents are
hardly in perfect harmony, the Supreme Court has generally refused
to infer ratification from mere amendment of adjacent clauses in
these circumstances. 1I374 He also added that lI[a]s [Congressional] inaction is inadequate to repeal a law, it should be inadequate to modify
a law. Yet modification is required to sustain an interpretation that
is invalid as against the original legislation. 11375 He asserted:

373. 17 F.3d at 14n.
Judge Williams, however, did not refer to the apparent alternative holding in Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988), that "Congress'
failure" to "modify the taking prohibition in any matter ... indicates satisfaction with the current definition of harm and its interpretation by the Secretary and the judiciary" and that "the
Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the presumption that Congress is 'aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts) that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.'" ld. at 1109 & n.6 (quoting Lindahl v. Office of Personnel
Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985»; see supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
Judge Williams also failed to cite or analyze Lindahl in his opinion for the court in Sweet Home
11.
In his analysis of decisions dealing with whether congressional action or inaction constitutes ratification of an earlier judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute, Judge
Williams in Sweet Home 11 stated:
"Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress' failure to act, a
refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least
some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the
administrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it."
17 F.3d at 1471 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, lnc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985».
Judge Williams, however, did not explicitly apply this principle to the facts of the case in Sweet
Home 11. He failed to consider that Congress' failure to amend the Act's definition of "take" in
1982,. when members of a congressional subcommittee had knowledge of the Service's 1981
redefinition of "harm" and the Palila 1 decision, was at least some evidence of the reasonableness of the Service's interpretation of the Act. See id. at 1469.
The support provided by Congress' failure in 1982 to amend the Endangered Species Act's
definition of "take" is weaker, however, than the situation in Riverside Bayview. In Riverside
Bayview, Congress had considered, but did not enact, bills that would have changed the Corps
of Engineers' regulations providing that certain wetlands were with.io the definition of "waters
of the United States: under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1362(7) (1982), and there was
discussion of the Corps' interpretation both in Committee reports and on the floors of both
houses of Congress. See 474 U.S. at 135-39.
However, when Congress amended the Endangered Species Act in 1982, a bill was
introduced that would have amended the Act's definition of "take" to exclude some types of
habitat modification but it was later withdrawn. 17 F.3d at 1467-69. Neither that withdrawn
bill nor the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" was cited or discussed in Committee reports
or floor debates. See id.
374. 17 F.3d at 1469. Congress in 1982 did not reenact or amend section 3(19),16 U.S.c. §
1532(19) (1976), of the Endangered Species Act:- See Palila v. Hawaii Oep't of Land & Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988); 17 F.3d at 1472.
375. 17 F.3d at 1471 (emphasis added).
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that the cases drawing inferences from [Congress'] inaction typically fail to address the serious jurisprudential problems of doing
so-especially those captured in Judge Wald's observation that
there are plenty of statutes "on the books for which no congressional majority could presently be generated either to reenact or to
repeal." It hardly seems consistent to enforce such statutes yet to
accept non-amendment of an interpretation as the equivalent of
congressional endorsement.376

Judge Williams then concluded his analysis regarding whether
Congress in 1982 had ratified the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981
regulation redefining "harm" as follows:

If the 1982 Congress had reentlcted the pertinent sections of the
... [Endangered Species Act] and "voice[d] its approval" of the ...
[Fish and Wildlife Service's] interpretation, it might be appropriate
to treat the reenactment as an adoption of that interpretation. Here,
however, Congress neither reenacted the section having to do with
"take," nor "voiced its approval" of the harm regulation.... [I]ts
creation of the [§ 10 (a)(1)(B)] permit scheme is fully consistent with
the meaning of "take" as enacted in 1973; the other developments
show no more than awareness of the Service's view, its survival in
Palila [IJ, and the absence of any action to endorse or repudiate
those developments.377
Accordingly, Judge Williams invalidated the Fish and Wildlife
Service's regulation defining "harm" to include habitat modification
and reversed the judgment of the district court "to that extent," but
otherwise left the judgment of the court in Sweet Home I "unaltered. "378
Subsequently, in his statement Goined in by Judge Sentelle) supporting the denial of appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home
II, Judge Williams noted that:
The government faults the panel [in Sweet Home II) for failing to
specify whether the regulation'S excess of statutory authOrity failed
under the first or second "step" of the analysiS set forth in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Petition at 9-10, and in a
more general way for failing to give the agency the deference that is
its due under Chevron. Because the court in determining whether
Congress "unambiguously expressed" its intent on the issue, see 467
U.S. at 843, is to employ all the "traditional tools of statutory
construction," INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987), the

376. Id. at 1472 (citation omitted) (quoting Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at
458).
377. rd. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
378. Id.
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factors involved in the first "step" are also pertinent to whether an
agency's interpretation is "reasonable". Thus the exact point where
an agency interpretation falls down may be unclear. Indeed, the
Chevron Court itself never specified which step it was applying at
any point in its analysis, see 467 U.S. at 859-66.
Nonetheless, we conclude that the statute, fairly read in the
light of the "traditional tools of statutory interpretation", manifests a
clear determination by Congress that the prohibitions of § 9 should
not reach habitat modifications as defined by the Department,
where there is no direct action by the defendant against any
member of the species. Extending the word "harm" to reach habitat
modification as so conceived carries § 9's prohibition far beyond the
reach effected by all the other terms used in the definition; it applies
to every citizen duties the Act expressly imposed only on federal
government agencies; and it ignores the plausible inferences from
the Senate's deletion of the phrase "habitat modification" from the
draft bill. The extension vests the Department with authority to
supervise the use of privately owned land in vast tracts of the
United States, even to the point of forbidding modest clearing
efforts conducted in the interest of fire protection in popUlated
areas. Congress clearly did not hang so massive an expansion of
government power on so slight a nail as § 9's provision that no one
should "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" an endangered sp'ecies.379

Judge Williams in Sweet Home II changed his pOSition from his
concurrence in Sweet Home I, in which he had agreed that the Fish
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" "complies with the
Endangered Species Act-but only because ... the 1982 amendments
to the ... [Act, enacting the section 10(a)(l)(B)380 incidental take
permit provision] support the inference that the ... [Act] otherwise
forbids some such incidental takings, including some habitat
modification. "381 In Sweet Home II, Judge Williams changed his
position with respect to section 10(a)(l)(B) and held that section
lO(a)(l)(B) only applied to a "take" involving the direct application of
force and did not "include the habitat modifications embraced by the
Service's definition of 'harm."'382 Having changed his interpretation
of section 10(a)(l)(B), which had been the only basis of his concurrence in Sweet Home I, Judge Williams joined Judge Sentelle in Sweet

379. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of
Williams, J.) (citations omitted), em. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859).
380. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988).
381. 1 F.3d at 11 (Williams, J., concurring) (emphasiS added).
382. 17 F.3d at 1467.
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Home II to hold invalid the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation
defining "harm" to include habitat modification.
In Sweet Home II, Judge Sentelle concurred with Judge Williams'
decision to reverse the district court judgment in part and stated that
he remained of the view expressed in his Sweet Home ]383 dissent that
the Service's definition of "harm" "cannot reasonably be defined to
include the broadly prohibited habitat modification encompassed in
the challenged regulation."384 Judge Sentelle stated that he found
"the words and structure of the Act sufficiently clear as to require no
resort to legislative history."38S He therefore concurred with "those
portions of Judge Williams' opinion that ... [relied] on the structure
of the Act and on the maxim of noscitur a sociis," and noted, as in his
dissent in Sweet Home I, "that to define 'harm' as broadly as does the
Secretary is to render all other words in the statutory definition of
'taking' superfluous in violation of the presumption against surplusage."386
Chief Judge Mikva dissented in Sweet Home II,387 arguing388 that
Judge Williams' majority decision on rehearing violated the Chevron
U.S.A.389 doctrine. 39O Chief Judge Mikva noted391 that Judge
Williams only cited Chevron U.S.A. once in Sweet Home II, after he
stated that the Fish and Wildlife "Service's definition of 'harm' was
neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute."392 Chief Judge Mikva quoted393 the following
paragraph from Chevron U.S.A.:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or

383. 1 F.3d at 11 (Sentelle, T., dissenting). See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
384. 17 F.3d at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring).

385. [d.
386. [d.
387. [d.
388. Id.

at 1473 (Mikva, CT., dissenting).
at 1473-78.
389. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
390. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
391. 17 F.3d at 1473 (Mikva, CT., dissenting).
392. 17 F.3d at 1464.
393. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, Cr, dissenting).
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ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.394
Chief Judge Mikva then stated that:
Plainly, Chevron does not place the burden on the responsible
agency to show that its interpretation is clearly authorized or reasonable. On the contrary, the burden is on the party seeking to
overturn such an interpretation to show that Congress has clearly
spoken to the contrary, or that the agency's interpretation is unreasonable. The whole point of Chevron deference is that when Congress has not given a clear command, we presume that it has
accorded discretion to the agency to clarify any ambiguities in the
statute it administers. In requiring the agency to justify its regulation by reference to such a clear command, the majority confounds
its role. Ties are supposed to go to the dealer under Chevron.395
Chief Judge Mikva's dissent also criticized Judge Williams' majority opinion for failing to clarify whether the court was invalidating
the Service's regulation defining "harm" under step one of Chevron
U.S.A. because Congress clearly and unambiguously addressed the
issue of whether "harm" includes "significant habitat modification
[that] actually kills or injures wildlife," or under step two of Chevron
U.S.A. because the Service's definition was not a permissible or
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.396 Chief Judge
Mikva argued that the Endangered Species Act, regarding step one
of Chevron U.S.A., "surely ... is silent, or at best ambiguous on this
question,"397 so that the only question under step two of the Chevron
U.S.A. doctrine is:
whether the ... [Service's] interpretation of the word "harm" constitutes a "permissible" reading of the ambiguous language. The
question is not . .. whether we think it constitutes the best reading.
Under ... [Chevron U.S.A.], "[t]he court need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judidal
proceeding. "398
Chief Judge Mikva asserted in his dissent in Sweet Home II that
the majority violated the Chevron U.S.A. standard by substituting "its

394. rd. (quoting 467 US. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted».
395. rd. (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
396. Id. at 1473-74.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1474 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, 843 & n.ll) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added».

1995]

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

231

own favorite reading of the Endangered Species Act for that of the
agency," when "the only question is the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. A fair reading allows for no other conclusion
than that the agency's interpretation is reasonable."399
Chief Judge Mikva's dissent then criticized the majority for relying on the "seldom-invoked" noscitur a sociis principle of statutory
construction.400 He argued that this principle was incorrectly applied by the majority,401 because the principle is applicable "when a
potentially broad word appears in a definition . . . with a list of
narrow words, II while the Act's definition of "take" includes several
words, including "harass," "wound" and "kill," which "might be read
as broadly, or nearly as broadly, as 'harm.'''402
In his analysis of the noscitur a sociis maxim, Chief Judge Mikva
distinguished the holding of United States v. Hayashi,403 upon which
Judge Williams relied in his ,majority opinion,404 on the grounds that
the Marine Mammal Protection Act's definition of "take"405 only includes the terms "harass," "hunt," "capture," and "kill," but not the
"more expansive" terms "harm," "wound," and "pursue," found in the
Endangered Species Act's definition of "take."406 Chief Judge Mikva
also noted that Hayashi was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which held in Palila II407 that the Service's "interpretation of
'harm' to include significant habitat modification is consistent with
the language, purpose, and legislative history" of the Endangered
Species Act.408
In his Sweet Home II dissent, Chief Judge Mikva also asserted that
Judge Sentelle's use of the presumption against surplusage409 was
"[e]quaUy [as] inappropriate" as his use of the noscitur a sociis
399.

rd.; see infra note 453.
17 F.3d at 1774. Chief Judge Mikva also concluded in Sweet Home I, 1 F.3d at 10
(Mikva, c.J., concurring), that the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" was not
impermissible under the noscitur a sociis maxim. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying
text.
401. 17 F.3d at 1475.
,
402. rd. at 1474. Chief Judge Mikva commented that the Fish and Wildlife Service "has
defined ... 'harass' nearly as broadly as the term 'harm.'" and that the definition of "harass"
had not been challenged. rd. at 1474-75.
403. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993).
404. See supra notes 330-36 and accompanying text.
405. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1988). See supra note 331.
406. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C,J., dissenting).
407. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1107-09 (9th Cir.

400.

1988).

408. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 230-53 and accompanying
text. Judge Mikva contended that "today's contrary decision thus creates a foolish circuit
conflict." 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
409. See id. at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring); Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 13 (D.c. Cir.
1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 319-20, 386 and accompanying text.
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principle of statutory construction.410 Although conceding that
"[t]here is no reasonable definition of the word 'harm' (or, for that
matter, the word 'harass') that would not render superfluous some of
the other defined terms," and that "one cannot 'kill' or 'wound' an
animal without also 'harming' it, even under the narrowest conceivable interpretation of 'harm',"411 Chief Judge Mikva argued that the
majority's holding "read[s] 'harm' out of the statute altogether."412
This result contradicts "Congress's [sic] intent ... to define takings 'in
the broadest possible manner to include any conceivable way in
which a person can "take" or attempt to "take" any fish or wildlife.'''413 He added that:
[d]efining "harm" to include "significant habitat modification" renders no more terms superfluous than would a definition that did not
include habitat modification but did include "direct" forms of killing and wounding. And indeed, the majority's holding that "harm"
cannot include indirect means of injuring wildlife may render
"harm" itself superfluous, or nearly so, as "direct" means of injury
are well covered by the other terms. 414
Chief Judge Mikva also contended that the legislative history relating to the Endangered Species Act's taking provision,415 was "most
ambiguous regarding whether Congress intended to include habitat
modification within the meaning of 'take,"'416 contrary to the majority's conclusion that this legislative history of the "take" provision
establishes that Congress "deliberate[ly] delet[ed] ... habitat modification from the definition of 'take.'''417 Chief Judge Mikva pointed
out in his Sweet Home II dissent, as well as his Sweet Home I concurrence,418 that there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act
indicating why the Senate Commerce Committee adopted the
definition of "take" in S. 1592 rather than S. 1983's definition of "take,"
which included habitat "destruction, modification, or curtailment."419
He also noted that the term "harm" was added to the Act's definition
of "take" on the floor of the Senate without a committee vote on the
issue.42o Arguing that the floor addition of "harm" to the Act's

410. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 1d.

(quoting S. REp. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973».
414. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva. c.J., dissenting).
415. See supra notes 285-89, 340-44 and accompanying text.
416. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting).
417. Id. at 1467. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
418. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva. C.J., concurring). See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
419. 17 F.3d at 1474-76 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting).
420. Id. at 1476.
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definition of "take" "can only have broadened the definition from the
bill reported out of Committee-'clarifying' that 'take' should be
defined 'in the broadest possible manner,"'421 Chief Judge Mikva
asserted that for purposes of the Chevron doctrine:
fI1here is nothing to suggest that Congress chose the definition
it did in order to exclude habitat modification. The Committee may
have rejected the S. 1983 defmition only because it apparently
would have made habitat modification a per se violation of the
[Endangered Species Act], as opposed to leaving such determinations to the discretion of the responsible agency. . . . Surely there is
nothing to indicate that the Committee intended to foreclose an
administrative regulation prohibiting habitat modificationparticularly a prohibition ... requiring that there be actual injury or
death to wildlife.422

As in his Sweet Home 1423 concurring opinion, Chief Judge Mikva
argued in his Sweet Home II dissent that n[n]othing in the language of
16 U.S.c. § 1534 or in the legislative history" establishes "that

Congress intended land acquisition to be the exclusive instrument
for curbing habitat modification on private lands. "424 He noted that
Judge Williams referred only to floor statements by members of
Congress425 to support his "totally speculative" "contention that
Congress intended land acquisition [under 16 U.S.c. § 1534] to be the
exclusive instrument for curbing habitat modification on private
lands." Chief Judge Mikva argued "that 'debates in Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe
guide ... in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making body."'426 He added that "[i]n any case, these statements do not
establish that even the speakers themselves intended land acquisition to be the exclusive protective mechanism for habitats on private
lands. "427
In his Sweet Home II dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Mikva
found, as he had in his concurring opinion in Sweet Home I,428 that
the Service's definition of "harm" was supported by Congress'

421. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 3fJ7, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973».

422. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting) (emphasis added).
423. 1 F.3d at 9-10 (Mikva, C.]., concurring). See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying
text.

424. 17 F.3d at 1476.
425. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
426. 17 F.3d at 1476 (quoting Duplex Printing Press. Co. v. Deering, 2S4 U.s. 443, 474
(1921».
427. Id. (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
428. 1 F.3d at 10-11 (Mikva, C.]., concurring). See supra notes 302-06 and accompanying
text.
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enactment in 1982 of section 10(a)(1)(B)'s incidental take permit provision.429 He interpreted the term "incidental takings" in section
10(a)(1)(B) as meaning habitat modification, which would be prohibited under the Act without a permit.43O Although he implied that
the enactment in 1982 of this incidental take permit provision alone
does not support a decision to uphold the Service's definition of
"harm,"431 he asserted that the 1982 amendments to the Endangered
Species Act "indicate that Congress in 1982 probably believed that
habitat modification was properly covered by the prohibition on takings."432 He conceded that "the 1982 amendments prove little about
Congress's [sic] intent in 1973," but he noted that Congress in 1973
"was silent on the question" of whether "take" includes habitat modification. 433 He argued that "[c]onsequently, the 1982 amendments
.. , lend some weight to the reasonableness of the agency's
definition-if Congress in 1982 believed the definition was reasonable, and the agency believed it was reasonable, then Chevron [sic]
demands that we uphold the regulation unless we find solid evidence to the contrary. No such evidence exists."434
Based on his analysis of "the language, structure, purpose, [and]
legislative history"435 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and of
the 1982 amendments to the Act and its legislative history, Chief
Judge Mikva concluded in his Sweet Home II dissent that Congress
had not "unambiguously command [ed]" that "harm" does not
include habitat modification.436 He stated that "the statute ... [was]
silent, or at best ambiguous,"437 on the question of whether "harm"
includes "significant habitat modification [that] actually kills or
injures wildlife."438 Thus, a court could not, under Chevron U.S.A.,
invalidate the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm"
on the grounds that it is contrary to the clear or unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. 439
This conclusion by Chief Judge Mikva is clearly a correct application of Chevron U.S.A. There is no clear language in the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, the 1982 amendments to the Act, or legislative
429. 17 F.3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting).
430. [d. at 1477.
431. Id. ("Uudge Williams in Sweet Home 1] was wrong to rely solely on the
ments for his decision; I agree that they do not alone support its weight.").
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1477-78.
434. Id. at 1478.
435. 1d. at 1476.
436. Id. at 1478.
437. Id. at 1473-74.
438. ld.
439. ld. at 1476, 1478.

1982 amend-
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history of either, that expressed an unambiguous intent by Congress
regarding whether "harm" includes "significant habitat modification
[that] actually kills or injures wildlife."44O Furthermore, the noscitur a
sociis and presumption against surplusage maxims do not demonstrate an "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"441 on this
question within the meaning of the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine. Consequently, because Congress has not unambiguously spoken to provide its clear intent on whether "harm" includes habitat modification,
Chevron U.S.A. prohibits a court from imposing its own construction
of the silent or ambiguous statute,442 and requires the court to
uphold the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" if it is a
permissible or reasonable interpretation of the Act.443
Judge Williams in his majority opinion in Sweet Home II incorrectly placed the burden on the Fish and Wildlife Service to show
that Congress clearly authorized the Service's definition of "harm. "444
As Chief Judge Mikva noted in his dissenting opinion in Sweet Home
II, Chevron U.S.A. "does not place the burden on the responsible
agency to show that its interpretation is clearly authorized or reasonable. On the contrary, the burden is on the party seeking to overturn
such an interpretation to show that Congress has clearly spoken to
the contrary, or that the agency's interpretation is unreasonable."445
Applying this interpretation of Chevron U.S.A., Chief Judge
Mikva concluded in his Sweet Home II dissent that the Service's
definition of "harm" "is a permissible exercise of its discretion as
delegated by Congress," and therefore should be upheld under the
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine. 446 Chief Judge Mikva argued that the
Service's definition was supported by legislative history of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 "which suggest[s] that Congress envisioned a broad interpretation of 'take,' even before the crucial word
'harm' was added to the definition of that term,"447 as well as by the
440. rd. at 1473-74.
441. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
442 ld. at 843-44.
443. rd. at 843-45.
444. 17 F.3d at 1464 ("We find that the Service's definition of 'harm' was neither clearly

authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute."). This statement by
Judge Williams, however, does not explicitly place the burden on the federal government to
show that the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" is a reasonable interpretation of the Act, as
Chief Judge Mikva contended. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
445. rd. at 1473 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see supra notes 395-96 and
accompanying text.
446. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting).
447. ld. at 1477 (citing S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) ('''Take' is defined ... in
the broadest possible manner."»; H.R. REP. NO. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973) ("[The Act)
includes, in the broadest possible terms, restrictions on the taking, importation and exportation, and transportation of [endangered) species, as well as other specified acts."); Sweet Home I,
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1982 enactment of the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental take permit provision.448 As Chief Judge Mikva stressed in his Sweet Home II dissent, the majority in Sweet Home II made:
no effort . . . to determine whether the agency could reasonably
have relied on such [1982] amendments as persuasive evidence supporting its interpretation. Instead, the agency ... [was] asked to
prove that the best interpretation of "harm" encompasses habitat
modification. Beginning from a wrong premise, applying a wrong
standard, it is not surprising that the wrong result . . . [was]
achieved. 449

He added that the majority's decision created a split among the
circuit court of appeals because "[t]he Ninth Circuit determined, in
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, . . . that the
[Fish and Wildlife Service's] 'harm' definition was a permissible
interpretation of the statute. 114SO
VI. CONCLUSION

Judge Williams' majority opinion in Sweet Home II should be
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. The Fish and Wildlife
Service's definition of "harm" should be upheld by the Supreme
Court under the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine as a reasonable and permissible interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, for the reasons set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Palila II,451 and by Chief Judge
Mikva in his concurring opinion in Sweet Home 1452 and in his
dissenting opinion in Sweet Home II.453 The reasons for upholding

1 F.3d at 11 (stating that "'[h]arass' includes activities of bird watchers 'where the effect of those
activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young'")
(quoting 5. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973». Chief Judge Mikva also referred "to the
floor amendment that added the word 'harm,' purportedly to 'clarify' language that was
'omitted' from the draft that emerged from Committee." 17 F.3d at 1477 (quoting 119 CONGo
REc. 525,683 Ouly 24, 1973) (statement by Sen. Tunney».
448. 17 F 3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 429-39 and accompanying
text.
449. 17 F.3d at 1478 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
450. Id. (citing 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988». See supra notes 229-55 and accompanying
text.
451. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108.{)9 (9th Cir.
1988). See supra notes 230-53 and accompanying text
452. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,8 (D.c. Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C.]., concurring),
modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994),
art. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). See supra notes 283-308 and accompanying text.
453. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1473 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Mikva, q.,
dissenting), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995)
(No. 94-859). Judge Silberman, in a dissenting opinion. joined by Chief Judge Mikva and Judge
Wald, argued that:
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the Service's definition of "harm," as a reasonable and permissible
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, include: (1) that the
Service's definition furthers both the Act's purpose of conserving
wildlife habitat and Congress' intent to define "take" as broadly as
possible to protect wildlife;454 and (2) Congress' enactment in 1982 of
the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental taking permit provision provides
reasonable support for the Service's interpretation of "harm" to
include habitat modification.455 The Fish and Wildlife Service's
definition of "harm" should not be found to be unreasonable or impermissible under a Chevron U.S.A. analysis, either because habitat
modification was deleted from the original version of S. 1983,456
because of the legislative history with respect to the federal land
acquisition program under section 4 of the Act,457 or because of the

Assuming the challenge to the regulation is ripe and that Chevron [sic] controls
our review, I think the Chief Judge [Mikva] has the better of the argument. . .. I
do not think ... that the majority has submitted to the diSCipline of the Chevron
[sic] framework and given the Department of Interior its due deference. It was
certainly not apparent whether the majority's initial opinion rested on Chevron
[sic] Step I or Step II. In its response to the government's petition for rehearing,
the panel majority appears to shift perceptibly to a Step I "clear determination by
Congress, n against which no deference to the agency's interpretation is appropriate. I do not find in either the statutory language or the legislative history any
such fixed view. And at the second step (which is where I would analyze the
case), maxims of statutory construction like noscitur a sociis, although not totally
irrelevant, certainly have less force. See Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (D.C Cir.), affd per curiam by an equally divided
cqurl, 493 U.s. 38 (1989). I quite agree with the panel that "the factors involved in
the first 'step' are also pertinent to whether an agency's interpretation is 'reasonable;'· ... but when thinking of the statute at that second step, one must assume
that the statute has more than one plaUSible construction as it applies to the case
before you. If the agency offers one-it prevails.
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en bane) (some citations omitted), eert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6,
1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Silbennan's opinion in Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d at 1292, states that:
Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among various canons
of statutory construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations of amqiguous
statutes. If a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency
decision merely because it failed to rely on anyone of a number of canons of construction that might have shaded the interpretation a few degrees in one direction
or another.
Id.
454. See Palila II, 852 F.2d at 1108-09; Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 8-9 (Mikva,
CJ., concurring); Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1476-77 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting).
See supra notes 24.5-46 and accompanying text.
455. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting). See
supra notes 428-39 and accompanying text.
456. See 17 F.3d at 1467. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
457. See 17 F.3d at 1466. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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statutory construction maxims of noscitur a sociis458 or surplusage.459
Chief Judge Mikva in his Sweet Home 1460 concurrence and in his
Sweet Home II461 dissent presented reasonable rebuttals to each of
these arguments. The Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 regulation redefining "harm" is a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the Endangered Species Act and should be upheld under the
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine.
Furthermore, courts should liberally construe the Service's 1981
redefinition of "harm." This liberal construction should prohibit acts,
including habitat modification, that kill or physically injure individual wild animals and acts, including habitat modification, that
adversely impact entire species' - or a large number of animals'breeding, feeding, or sheltering, causing a decline in the species'
population and threatening the species with extinction or preventing
the species from recovering.
The Service's definition of "harm" also should be interpreted to
prohibit local, state, or federal governmental officials or agencies
from permitting, licensing, or funding another person's act that
would "take" an endangered or threatened species, when such authorization or funding is a prerequisite to that other person's act. In
addition, the failure of a person or agency to perform a duty should
be a "harm" that is prohibited by the Service's regulations and the
Act when that omission causes death or injury to a protected species.
As noted by Chief Judge Mikva in his dissent in Sweet Home II,
"[t]he purpose of the Endangered Species Act, lest we forget, is to
protect endangered species. In [Sweet Home II's] abandonment of
[the panel's] decision of less than a year ago, [the] court ... [took] a
large step backward from that purpose. The majority [in Sweet Home
II] may believe it ... [made] good policy-but that is not [a court's]
job."462

458. See 1 F.3d at 12-13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying
text.
459. See 1 F.3d at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying
text.
460. 1 F.3d at 8-11 (Mikva, c.J., concurring). See supra notes 283-308 and accompanying
text.
461. 17 F.3d at 1473-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 387-450 and accompanyingtext.
462. 17 F.3d at 1478 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting); see Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the
Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With
a PlJWerfuI Species Preseroation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).

